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Introduction 
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the conditions 
under which students in high school can be punished for their speech 
and, in addition, has analyzed a couple of cases in which university 
students were dismissed from professional programs for academic 
reasons. But the Court has said relatively little about whether or how 
to use the high school student speech jurisprudence in the university 
context and about whether or how to apply the academic dismissal 
jurisprudence in other kinds of contexts. The Court’s reticence on 
these matters is unfortunate because lower courts have been forced to 
address the constitutionality of different kinds of university student 
dismissals without necessary guidance from the Court. 
Several courts have addressed the conditions under which 
students may be dismissed from professional programs for 
unprofessional comments or practices. These courts’ approaches have 
varied with respect to both the appropriate test to use and how 
particular tests should be applied. The Court’s failure to give more 
than minimal direction on these matters has resulted in dissimilar 
 
†  Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School. 
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treatment of relevantly similar cases—a trend that will only continue 
until the Court provides some greatly needed guidance. 
Part I of this Article discusses the Court’s student-speech and 
academic-dismissal jurisprudence, explaining some of the difficulties in 
providing a coherent account of what the Court has said. Part II 
discusses some of the cases arising in the lower courts, noting how 
those decisions do not cohere well with the approaches taken by other 
courts or, sometimes, by the Supreme Court. The Article concludes by 
predicting that the confusion and inconsistency in this area will con-
tinue to grow until the Court offers a coherent account specifying not 
only which principle is applicable but how that principle should be 
applied. 
I. Supreme Court Jurisprudence 
The United States Supreme Court has discussed the conditions 
under which schools can punish students for their speech without 
thereby offending First Amendment guarantees. Regrettably, that 
jurisprudence is murky at best. The Court has also addressed due 
process concerns in university academic dismissals, but those cases 
offer little or no guidance with respect to First Amendment 
protections of students dismissed for unprofessional comments or 
activities. The current jurisprudence on university students’ rights in 
the context of dismissals from professional programs is largely 
unchartered, creating uncertainties and risks for students and 
universities alike. 
A. Student Speech Rights in Secondary Schools 
The Court has issued several decisions involving the First Amend-
ment rights of high school students. At first, student-speech 
protections seemed relatively robust, although later decisions weak-
ened those guarantees in not clearly defined ways. In addition, the 
Court has offered some limited guidance with respect to due process 
issues raised in the context of university student dismissals for 
academic reasons. Those cases provide universities and students with 
much too little guidance. In short, the Supreme Court has provided 
almost no guidance with respect to the proper approach to 
determining whether student dismissals from professional programs 
violate constitutional guarantees. 
The seminal case in the Court’s student speech rights 
jurisprudence is Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District,1 which involved students who wore black armbands to their 
 
1. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). See Raul R. Calvoz et al., Cyber Bullying and Free Speech: 
Striking an Age-Appropriate Balance, 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 357, 364 (2013) 
(discussing “the Court’s seminal student speech case of Tinker v. Des Moines”); 
	  
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the Constitution 
99 
schools to protest the Vietnam War.2 The students were sent home 
and suspended until willing to attend school without the armbands.3 
The schools’ actions were challenged in federal court.4 
The Tinker Court recognized that “First Amendment rights, ap-
plied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, 
are available to teachers and students.”5 Wearing armbands in school 
is “closely akin to ‘pure speech.’”6 In this case, the “silent, passive ex-
pression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or disturbance on 
the part of petitioners” neither interfered “with the schools’ work” nor 
adversely affected “the rights of other students to be secure and to be 
let alone.”7 While a few students made hostile comments to the 
protesters, “there were no threats or acts of violence on school prem-
ises.”8 
The district court upheld the school’s actions,9 reasoning that “the 
action of the school authorities was reasonable because it was based 
upon their fear of a disturbance from the wearing of the armbands.”10 
But the Court rejected that an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
of disturbance is . . . enough to overcome the right to freedom of 
expression.”11 
The authorities’ disagreement with the message alone was not 
enough to justify its suppression. “In order for the State in the person 
 
Thomas E. Wheeler II, Lessons from the Lord of the Flies: Protecting Students 
from Internet Threats and Cyber Hate Speech, 10 J. Internet L. 3, 4 (2006) 
(“Any examination of student free speech rights under the First Amendment 
must necessarily start with the seminal Supreme Court case Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District.”); Lindsay J. Gower, Blue 
Mountain School District v. J.S. Ex Rel. Snyder: Will the Supreme Court 
Provide Clarification for Public School Officials Regarding Off-Campus Internet 
Speech?, 64 Ala. L. Rev. 709, 710 (2013) (“Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District is the seminal case for student free speech rights.”). 
2. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504 (“On December 16, Mary Beth and Christopher 
[Eckhardt] wore black armbands to their schools. John Tinker wore his 
armband the next day.”). Other unnamed students also wore the armbands. 
See id. at 508 (“[F]ive students were suspended for wearing them.”). 
3. Id. at 504. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. at 506. 
6. Id. at 505. 
7. Id. at 508. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 504–05. 
10. Id. at 508. 
11. Id. 
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of school officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of 
opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused by 
something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and un-
pleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”12 The 
Court inferred that the school authorities had “an urgent wish to 
avoid the controversy which might result from the expression,”13 but 
the mere desire to remain uncontroversial could not justify the 
limitation on political speech. 
A brief examination of the school’s practices made them even 
more constitutionally suspect. The school had not adopted a uniform 
policy with respect to the expression of political views as a general 
matter.14 On the contrary, “students in some of the schools wore 
buttons relating to national political campaigns, and some even wore 
the Iron Cross, traditionally a symbol of Nazism.”15 At least in part 
because the school’s prohibition did not include other political 
messages16 but, instead, “a particular symbol—black armbands worn 
to exhibit opposition to this Nation’s involvement in Vietnam—was 
singled out for prohibition,”17 the Court held that the school 
authorities’ actions violated constitutional guarantees.18 
In striking down the school authorities’ actions, the Tinker Court 
was not thereby permitting students to prevent the schools from 
performing their mission. The Court expressly noted that the 
protesting students “neither interrupted school activities nor sought 
to intrude in the school affairs or the lives of others.”19 While leaving 
open how much actual or probable disruption would be required 
before a school suspension for student expression would be upheld, the 
Court nonetheless implied that the Constitution offered significant 
protection for students. Absent a “showing that engaging in the 
forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with 
the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school,’ the prohibition [could not] be sustained.”20 
 
12. Id. at 509. 
13. Id. at 510. 
14. Id. (“[T]he school authorities did not purport to prohibit the wearing of all 
symbols of political or controversial significance.”). 
15. Id. 
16. Id. (“The order prohibiting the wearing of armbands did not extend to 
these.”). 
17. Id. at 510–11. 
18. Id. at 514. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
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Subsequent case law suggests that protections of student speech 
may be less robust than the Tinker disruption standard implies. 
Bethel School District v. Fraser21 involved the punishment of a 
student for a nominating speech that, in the words of the majority, 
was “an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor.”22 Prior to 
its delivery, he had shown his speech to teachers who had “informed 
him that the speech was ‘inappropriate and that he probably should 
not deliver it.’”23 In addition, he had been warned that “his delivery of 
the speech might have ‘severe consequences.’”24 The speech included 
the following: 
 
I know a man who is firm—he’s firm in his pants, he’s firm in his 
shirt, his character is firm—but most . . . of all, his belief in you, 
the students of Bethel, is firm. 
 
Jeff Kuhlman is a man who takes his point and pounds it in. If 
necessary, he’ll take an issue and nail it to the wall. He doesn’t 
attack things in spurts—he drives hard, pushing and pushing 
until finally—he succeeds. 
 
Jeff is a man who will go to the very end—even the climax, for 
each and every one of you. 
 
So vote for Jeff for A.S.B. vice-president—he’ll never come 
between you and the best our high school can be.25 
 
Justice Brennan rejected that the speech was as offensive as one 
might have inferred from the Court’s description of it,26 although he 
nonetheless believed that the speech was punishable: 
[I]in light of the discretion school officials have to teach high 
school students how to conduct civil and effective public 
discourse, and to prevent disruption of school educational 
activities, it was not unconstitutional for school officials to 
 
21. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
22. Id. at 678. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 687 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
26. Id. (“The Court, referring to these remarks as ‘obscene,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘lewd,’ and 
‘offensively lewd,’ concludes that school officials properly punished respondent 
for uttering the speech. Having read the full text of respondent’s remarks, I 
find it difficult to believe that it is the same speech the Court describes.”). 
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conclude, under the circumstances of this case, that respondent’s 
remarks exceeded permissible limits.27  
A school counselor described some of the student reactions to the 
speech: “Some students hooted and yelled; some by gestures 
graphically simulated the sexual activities pointedly alluded to in 
respondent’s speech. Other students appeared to be bewildered and 
embarrassed by the speech.”28 But there had been testimony that the 
disruption at this assembly was no greater than usual,29 and the fact 
that three out of the 600 attending students made sexually suggestive 
movements did not amount to a disruption of the educational 
process.30 
Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
found that the Tinker material-disruption standard had not been 
met.31 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the 
school’s actions violated constitutional guarantees.32 
When reviewing the Ninth Circuit decision holding that Fraser’s 
speech was protected,33 the Court had a few options. It could have af-
firmed, recognizing that the Tinker material-disruption test had not 
been met. If, instead, the Supreme Court was going to reverse the 
Ninth Circuit decision, it either had to suggest that the Tinker 
disruption standard had been misapplied below and in fact had been 
met, or decide that student speech was not immune from punishment 
even if the Tinker standard had not been met. 
The Fraser Court chose the last approach, chastising the Ninth 
Circuit for not recognizing the “marked distinction between the 
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content 
of respondent’s speech.”34 In what might be described as a lesson in 
civility, the Court suggested that while there must be “tolerance of 
divergent political and religious views, even when the views expressed 
may be unpopular,”35 speakers must “take into account 
 
27. Id. at 687–88. 
28. Id. at 678 (majority opinion). 
29. Id. at 694 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 693. 
32. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 474 U.S. 814 (1985). 
33. Fraser v. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403, 755 F.2d 1356, 1363 (9th Cir. 1985), 
rev’d, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (“[W]e hold that the First Amendment prohibited 
the District from punishing Fraser for making a speech that school officials 
considered to be ‘indecent.’”). 
34. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680. 
35. Id. at 681. 
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consideration . . . , in the case of a school, the sensibilities of fellow 
students.”36 Without exploring the constitutional parameters of the 
announced approach, the Court explained that the “freedom to 
advocate unpopular and controversial views in schools and classrooms 
must be balanced against the society’s countervailing interest in 
teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”37 
One difficulty raised by the Court’s discussion of balancing un-
popular views against socially appropriate behavior is that the Court 
left open when that balancing should occur. One interpretation of 
Fraser is that this balancing only takes place when the speech 
involves sexual innuendo rather than political speech.38 But a different 
interpretation is that balancing is appropriate as a general matter,39 
and Fraser simply illustrates that lewd or indecent speech will not be 
weighed heavily in the balance.40 
A separate issue involves determining what constitutes socially 
appropriate behavior. The Court understood that there might well be 
disagreement about that, and suggested that the best approach was to 
defer to the judgment of school authorities. “The determination of 
what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is 




38. See Shannon L. Doering, Tinkering with School Discipline in the Name of 
the First Amendment: Expelling A Teacher’s Ability to Proactively Quell 
Disruptions Caused by Cyberbullies at the Schoolhouse, 87 Neb. L. Rev. 
630, 646 (2009) (“Fraser struck the balance in favor of protecting the 
rights of others and decorum within the school, and against affording 
First Amendment protection to speech of such little social value as 
Fraser’s speech.”); see also Kimbrilee M. Weber, Note, Banning 
‘Boobies’?: A Standard for School Districts to Evaluate Plausibly Lewd, 
on-Campus Student Speech in Light of B.H. Ex Rel. Hawk v. Easton Area 
School District, 45 Seton Hall L. Rev. 647, 652 (2015) (“Fraser is 
significant because it limits Tinker’s broad rule of permissibility and gives 
more power to school districts to ban or prevent student First 
Amendment speech that is classified as lewd.”); Jonathan Pyle, Speech in 
Public Schools: Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 586, 618 (2002) (“Justice Burger also suggested in Fraser that 
a balancing test limits students’ freedom to engage in low-value speech.”). 
39. See Ari Ezra Waldman, All Those Like You: Identity Aggression and 
Student Speech, 77 Mo. L. Rev. 653, 678 (2012) (“Bethel School District 
v. Fraser[] helps clarify the Court’s underlying balancing test in student 
speech cases.”). 
40. Mark W. Cordes, Making Sense of High School Speech After Morse v. 
Frederick, 17 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 657, 681 (2009) (“[I]t is clear 
that ‘lewd and indecent’ speech is not protected, as determined by 
Fraser.”). 
41. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
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is a highly appropriate function of public school education to prohibit 
the use of vulgar and offensive terms in public discourse.”42 
The Court did not limit the reach of its comments to speech in-
volving “sexual innuendo,”43 suggesting that vulgar speech included 
more than that.44 Indeed, “offensive terms in public discourse”45 might 
include speech that is neither lewd nor indecent. 
Years earlier, the Court noted in Street v. New York46 that “under 
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited 
merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their 
hearers.”47 However, the Street Court was not addressing offensive 
school speech, and the Fraser Court rejected that “simply because the 
use of an offensive form of expression may not be prohibited to adults 
making what the speaker considers a political point, the same latitude 
must be permitted to children in a public school.”48 Precisely because 
“the constitutional rights of students in public school are not auto-
matically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,”49 the 
Fraser Court suggested that the Constitution permitted a more 
robust limitation on student speech than merely a prohibition of 
sexually laden communications. 
The Fraser opinion is not a model of clarity with respect to the 
kind of school speech that can be prohibited.50 What made the opinion 
even more confusing was the Court’s repeated referrals to Fraser’s in-
appropriate conduct rather than speech.51 Traditionally, First 
 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 678. 
44. See id. at 684–85 (suggesting that speech about excretory functions might 
also be prohibited); see also Derek Ruzicka, It’s Political, You Can’t Be 
Offended! A Discussion of the Student Speech Analysis in Guiles Ex Rel. 
Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320 (2d Cir. 2006), 32 S. Ill. U. L.J. 469, 
472 (2008) (“The Court concluded the sexual content in Fraser’s address 
constituted lewd, vulgar, and plainly offensive speech. However it did not 
limit those terms to speech of a sexual nature.”). 
45. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683. 
46. 394 U.S. 576 (1969). 
47. Id. at 592. 
48. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682. 
49. Id. 
50. Sean R. Nuttall, Rethinking the Narrative on Judicial Deference in 
Student Speech Cases, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1282, 1302 (2008) (“Chief 
Justice Burger’s Fraser opinion . . . [is] not considered a model of 
clarity.”); see also Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007) (“The 
mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear.”). 
51. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (“Fraser was presented with copies of five letters 
submitted by teachers, describing his conduct at the assembly; he was 
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Amendment speech protections are more robust than are such 
protections for expressive conduct,52 and constitutional protections for 
expressive conduct are more robust than are constitutional protections 
for non-expressive conduct.53 But Fraser had done nothing other than 
give the speech—there was no allegation, for example, that Fraser had 
been among the students making the sexually suggestive movements.54 
It is unclear, then, if the Court’s reference to Fraser’s conduct had 
some doctrinal importance55 or, instead, was simply a way to capture 
why Fraser’s nominating speech violated the schools disruptive 
conduct rule.56 
 
given a chance to explain his conduct.”); id. at 680 (“The Court of 
Appeals read [Tinker] as precluding any discipline of Fraser for indecent 
speech and lewd conduct in the school assembly.”); id. at 683 (“The 
schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential 
lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that 
tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as that 
indulged in by this confused boy.”); id. at 685–86 (“[I]t was perfectly 
appropriate for the school to disassociate itself to make the point to the 
pupils that vulgar speech and lewd conduct is wholly inconsistent with the 
‘fundamental values’ of public school education.”); id. at 686 (discussing 
“the school’s need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide 
range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process”). 
52. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (“The government 
generally has a freer hand in restricting expressive conduct than it has in 
restricting the written or spoken word.”) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 
391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968); Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence, 
468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984); Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989)). 
53. Wesley J. Campbell, Speech-Facilitating Conduct, 68 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 
12 (2016) (“[T]he distinction between expressive and non-expressive 
conduct is absolutely crucial; restrictions of nonexpressive conduct do not 
implicate the First Amendment at all.”). 
54. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 678 (“During Fraser’s delivery of the speech, a school 
counselor observed the reaction of students to the speech. Some students 
hooted and yelled; some by gestures graphically simulated the sexual 
activities pointedly alluded to in respondent’s speech.”). 
55. See, e.g., Charles J. Russo & Floyd G. Delon, Warning: Student 
Expressive Activities and Assignments May Be Hazardous to Their 
Teachers’ Employment Health, 132 Ed. L. Rep. 595, 603 n.46 (1999) 
(suggesting that “Fraser focused on the authority of school officials to 
regulate the expressive conduct of students”). 
56. See Robert Block, Students’ Shrinking First Amendment Rights in the 
Public Schools: Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 35 DePaul L. 
Rev. 739, 751 (1986) (noting that “[t]he day after the speech, the 
assistant principal of Bethel High School charged Fraser with violating the 
school’s disruptive conduct rule”). 
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Fraser can be read either57 as modifying Tinker in that it adopted 
a balancing approach to student speech58 or as providing an exception 
to Tinker.59 In subsequent cases, the Court made the applicable juris-
prudence more confusing rather than less. 
In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,60 the Court examined 
a principal’s decision to excise articles from the school newspaper.61 
One of the articles of concern discussed some of the high school 
students’ experiences with pregnancy,62 while another discussed “the 
impact of divorce on students at the school.”63 Reynolds, the 
principal, worried that the students who had been pregnant were 
identifiable, even though their names had not been included in the 
article.64 In addition, he believed that a discussion of sexual activity 
and birth control was inappropriate for some of the younger 
students.65 The article concerning divorce contained some negative 
 
57. Scott A. Moss, The Overhyped Path from Tinker to Morse: How the 
Student Speech Cases Show the Limits of Supreme Court Decisions—For 
the Law and for the Litigants, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1407, 1425 (2011) 
(“Fraser’s various ill-explained rationales made it a Rorschach precedent, 
viewable as either distinguishing or undercutting Tinker.”). 
58. Andrew D. M. Miller, Balancing School Authority and Student Expression, 54 
Baylor L. Rev. 623, 631 (2002) (“[T]he Court refused to apply Tinker’s 
substantial and material interference test and instead employed a type of 
balancing test.”). 
59. See Joyce Dindo, The Various Interpretations of Morse v. Frederick: Just a 
Drug Exception or a Retraction of Student Free Speech Rights?, 37 Cap. U. 
L. Rev. 201, 205 (2008) (“This exception permits principals and school 
administrators to limit student speech that is ‘vulgar and lewd.’”); Abby 
Marie Mollen, In Defense of the “Hazardous Freedom” of Controversial 
Student Speech, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1501, 1509 (2008) 
(“Fraser . . . established a distinct standard apart from Tinker.”); Piotr 
Banasiak, Morse v. Frederick: Why Content-Based Exceptions, Deference, 
and Confusion Are Swallowing Tinker, 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1059, 1066 
(2009) (“[I]n Fraser, the Court shied away from the permissive Tinker 
standard and carved out an exception to Tinker based on lewd, indecent, and 
offensive speech.”). 
60. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
61. Id. at 278 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The school principal, without prior 
consultation or explanation, excised six articles—comprising two full pages—
of the May 13, 1983, issue of Spectrum. He did so not because any of the 
articles would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline,’ but simply because he considered two of the six 
‘inappropriate, personal, sensitive, and unsuitable’ for student consumption.”). 
62. Id. at 263 (majority opinion). 
63. Id. 
64. Id.  
65. Id. 
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characterizations of one parent,66 and the parents had not been 
afforded an opportunity to consent or respond.67 The end of the 
school year was approaching, and Principal Reynolds believed that 
there simply was not enough time to both edit the articles and to 
print the issue.68 He simply decided not to print the two pages 
containing the worrisome articles.69 
Three students who had been on the newspaper subsequently 
sued, claiming that their First Amendment rights had been 
abridged.70 The Eighth Circuit held that because the school 
newspaper was a public forum71 and because the deleted articles, if 
published, would not have made the school potentially liable in 
tort,72 the students’ First Amendment rights had been abridged 
when those two pages were deleted.73 
Citing Fraser, the Supreme Court began its analysis by noting 
that “the First Amendment rights of students in the public schools 
‘are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings,’”74 and that a “school need not tolerate student speech that 
is inconsistent with its ‘basic educational mission,’ even though the 
government could not censor similar speech outside the school.”75 
The Court cited Fraser for the proposition that schools need not 
tolerate speech inconsistent with the school’s mission, which seems 
to afford schools much greater leeway than merely the power to 
prohibit student use of “lewd, indecent, or offensive speech.”76 
The Kuhlmeier Court rejected that the newspaper was a public 
forum,77 in part because the school authorities had not “‘by policy or 
 
66. Id. (“Reynolds was concerned that a student identified by name in the 
divorce story had complained that her father ‘wasn’t spending enough 
time with my mom, my sister and I’ prior to the divorce, ‘was always out 
of town on business or out late playing cards with the guys,’ and ‘always 
argued about everything’ with her mother.”). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. at 263–64. 
69. Id. at 264. 
70. Id. at 262. 
71. Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood School Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1372 (8th Cir. 1986), 
rev’d, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
72. Id. at 1376. 
73. Id. at 1370. 
74. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). 
75. Id. (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685). 
76. Id. at 266–67 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
77. Id. at 269–70. 
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by practice’ opened those facilities ‘for indiscriminate use by the 
general public.’”78 Because school authorities had instead “‘reserve[d] 
the forum for its intended purpos[e],’ as a supervised learning 
experience for journalism students . . . , school officials were entitled 
to regulate the contents of Spectrum in any reasonable manner.”79 
Given that it was reasonableness, “rather than [the Court’s] decision 
in Tinker, that governs this case,”80 the Court’s holding that “no 
violation of First Amendment rights occurred”81 was unsurprising. 
The Kuhlmeier Court distinguished Tinker by noting that the 
“question whether the First Amendment requires a school to tolerate 
particular student speech—the question that we addressed in 
Tinker—is different from the question whether the First Amendment 
requires a school affirmatively to promote particular student 
speech.”82 This case involved “‘educators’ authority over school-
sponsored publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive 
activities that students, parents, and members of the public might 
reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”83 The 
student newspaper was appropriately “characterized as part of the 
school curriculum . . . [because] supervised by faculty members and 
designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to student 
participants and audiences.”84 But students do not have the right to 
say whatever they want in class, for example, offer a presentation on 
material unrelated to the course. Even professors do not have an 
unfettered First Amendment right to determine what is covered in a 
course.85 
After explaining that the school newspaper was more 
appropriately thought of as a part of the curriculum rather than a 
kind of public forum, the Court discussed the kind of deference that 
should be given to educators instead of students. “Educators are 
entitled to exercise greater control over . . . [the curriculum] to assure 
that participants learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to 
teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may 
 
78. Id. at 270 (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
79. Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 276. 
82. Id. at 270–71. 
83. Id. at 271. 
84. Id. 
85. See Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Pa., 156 F.3d 488, 491 (3d Cir. 1998) (“[A] 
public university professor does not have a First Amendment right to 
decide what will be taught in the classroom.”). 
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be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the 
individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to the school.”86 
This greater control gives schools wide latitude. For example, 
a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper 
or producer of a school play “disassociate itself,” not only from 
speech that would “substantially interfere with [its] work . . . or 
impinge upon the rights of other students,” but also from speech 
that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, 
inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, 
or unsuitable for immature audiences.87 
Once again, the Court suggested that the normal rules regarding 
the regulation of speech in society at large are distinguishable from 
the rules that are appropriate in the school context. For example, a 
“school must be able to set high standards for the student speech that 
is disseminated under its auspices—standards that may be higher 
than those demanded by some newspaper publishers or theatrical 
producers in the ‘real’ world—and may refuse to disseminate student 
speech that does not meet those standards.”88 Not only are schools 
permitted to refuse to publish speech that does not meet their own 
“high standards,”89 but they “retain the authority to refuse to sponsor 
student speech that might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug 
or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent 
with ‘the shared values of a civilized social order’ . . . .”90 The 
Kuhlmeier Court concluded that “the standard articulated in Tinker 
for determining when a school may punish student expression need 
not also be the standard for determining when a school may refuse to 
lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student 
expression.”91 
Like Fraser, Kuhlmeier might be read as creating another 
exception to Tinker,92 as a modification of Tinker,93 or perhaps as 
 
86. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271. 
87. Id. (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969)). 
88. Id. at 271–72. 
89. Id. at 271. 
90. Id. at 272 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
91. Id. at 272–73. 
92. See Banasiak, supra note 59, at 1060 (“The first exception, delineated in Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, permits school officials to suppress speech 
that is ‘offensively lewd and indecent;’ the second, delineated in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier, permits the restriction of speech that bears the 
imprimatur of the school, so long as the regulation is related ‘to legitimate 
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both.94 Further, whether reading these cases as creating exceptions or, 
instead, as modifying the jurisprudence, one must decide whether to 
read these decisions broadly or narrowly.95 The language in Fraser 
permitting schools to prohibit student speech not in accord with the 
school’s basic mission96 seems rather broad. The language in 
Kuhlmeier permitting limitations on speech inconsistent with the 
school’s or society’s positions on a variety of issues97 is also rather 
forgiving. While Kuhlmeier might merely be read to afford discretion 
to a school to avoid the attribution of views that the school does not 
hold,98 the opinion need not be read in such a limited way. If the only 
 
pedagogical concerns.’”); Clay Calvert, Tinker’s Midlife Crisis: Tattered and 
Transgressed but Still Standing, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 1167, 1191 (2009) (“[T]he 
Supreme Court cannot continue to carve out exceptions to Tinker, as it has 
done now in Fraser, Kuhlmeier and Morse.”); Jeremy Jorgensen, Student Rights 
Up in Smoke: The Supreme Court’s Clouded Judgment in Morse v. Frederick, 
25 Touro L. Rev. 739, 748 (2009) (“The second exception to Tinker emerged 
in Kuhlmeier, decided less than two years after Fraser, in 1988.”); Allison E. 
Hayes, From Armbands to Douchebags: How Doninger v. Niehoff Shows the 
Supreme Court Needs to Address Student Speech in the Cyber Age, 43 Akron 
L. Rev. 247, 253 (2010) (“Less than two years later, the Court added another 
exception to the Tinker standard when it decided Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.”). 
93. See Mickey Lee Jett, The Reach of the Schoolhouse Gate: The Fate of Tinker 
in the Age of Digital Social Media, 61 Cath. U. L. Rev. 895, 903 (2012) 
(“Less than two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court decided Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier—the second case that scaled back Tinker’s broad 
First Amendment protection.”). 
94. See Caroline B. Newcombe, Morse v. Frederick One Year Later: New 
Limitations on Student Speech and the “Columbine Factor”, 42 Suffolk U. 
L. Rev. 427, 431 (2009) (“Two years after Fraser, the Court in Hazelwood 
School District v. Kuhlmeier created a third approach to student speech, and 
a second exception to Tinker.”). 
95. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 58, at 662 (“Fraser and Kuhlmeier created narrow 
exceptions.”). But see Matthew I. Schiffhauer, Uncertainty at the “Outer 
Boundaries” of the First Amendment: Extending the Arm of School Authority 
Beyond the Schoolhouse Gate into Cyberspace, 24 St. John’s J. Legal 
Comment. 731, 738 (2010) (“The Court created vague exceptions to Tinker’s 
general rule in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier.”); Shannon L. Noder, Morse v. Frederick: Students’ 
First Amendment Rights Restricted Again, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 859, 859 
(2009) (“[In] Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier, the Court created exceptions to the standard 
established in Tinker, thereby allowing for greater censorship of student 
speech and unsettling this area of First Amendment jurisprudence.”). 
96. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 266 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 
U.S. 675, 685 (1986)). 
97. Id. at 272 (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683). 
98. Id. at 271. 
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evil to be avoided was a mistaken attribution of particular views to 
the school, then the newspaper might simply have contained a 
disclaimer that the views reflected therein were not necessarily 
endorsed by the school.99 
The Court’s next decision in this line of cases did not clarify these 
issues very much either. Morse v. Frederick100 involved the 
punishment of a student carrying a banner that read “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS”101 at a school-sponsored event.102 While admitting that the 
“message on Frederick’s banner is cryptic,”103 the Court nonetheless 
suggested that the message might reasonably be understood to be 
promoting illegal drug use.104 As such, the message’s suppression at a 
school event did not violate First Amendment guarantees.105 
The Morse Court did not help clarify Fraser and Kuhlmeier. With 
respect to Fraser, the Court expressly noted that the “mode of 
analysis employed in Fraser is not entirely clear,”106 and then 
commented that “it is enough to distill from Fraser two basic 
principles:”107 (1) “Fraser’s holding demonstrates that ‘the 
constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings,’”108 and (2) 
“Fraser established that the mode of analysis set forth in Tinker is 
not absolute . . . [because] Fraser . . . did not conduct the ‘substantial 
disruption’ analysis prescribed by Tinker.”109 Basically, the Court 
 
99. Cf. Hon. Delissa A. Ridgway, Getting Published, 47 Fed. Law. 14, 16 (2000) 
(“[A] piece by a U.S. government employee often includes a note that ‘the 
views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. government.’”). 
100. 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
101. Id. at 397. 
102. Id. at 401 (“[W]e agree with the superintendent that Frederick cannot ‘stand 
in the midst of his fellow students, during school hours, at a school-sanctioned 
activity and claim he is not at school.’”). 
103. Id. 
104. Id.  
105. Id. at 403 (“The question thus becomes whether a principal may, consistent 
with the First Amendment, restrict student speech at a school event, when 
that speech is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. We hold that 
she may.”). 
106. Id. at 404. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 404–05 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 
(1986)). 
109. Id. at 405 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 
514 (1969)). 
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suggested that Fraser establishes that the First Amendment freedoms 
of students in school are not as robust as the rights of adults in other 
settings and that a showing of a substantial disruption is not required 
in order for a school speech prohibition to be compatible with 
constitutional guarantees. 
The Court’s discussion of Kuhlmeier did not limit its reach. While 
the Morse Court noted that “Kuhlmeier does not control this case 
because no one would reasonably believe that Frederick’s banner bore 
the school’s imprimatur,”110 that comment merely explained why 
Kuhlmeier was not dispositive. The Court’s comment did not 
additionally suggest that Kuhlmeier was only relevant in cases 
involving a mistaken imputation of imprimatur. Instead, the Court 
read Kuhlmeier to support Fraser’s principles: (1) Kuhlmeier 
“acknowledged that schools may regulate some speech ‘even though 
the government could not censor similar speech outside the school,’”111 
and (2) “like Fraser, it confirms that the rule of Tinker is not the 
only basis for restricting student speech.”112 
After supporting its contention that Kuhlmeier and Fraser estab-
lished that student speech could be prohibited even if the Tinker 
substantial-disruption standard had not been met, the Morse Court 
started discussing the dangers of drug use: “Drug abuse can cause 
severe and permanent damage to the health and well-being of young 
people.”113 Because the speech at issue occurred during a school 
event114 and because of “the governmental interest in stopping student 
drug abuse,” schools are permitted “to restrict student expression that 
they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”115 
Yet, the government has an interest in preventing a variety of 
student practices, so it is not clear what on-site speech the Fraser-
Kuhlmeier-Morse analysis permits schools to regulate. For example, 
the state has an interest in preventing teenage pregnancy,116 and it is 
unclear whether student discussions of such issues could be prohibited 
even where there is no danger of a misattribution of the student’s 
 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 405–06 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 
(1988)). 
112. Id. at 406. 
113. Id. at 407. 
114. Id. at 408 (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). 
115. Id. 
116. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma Cty., 450 U.S. 464, 472–73 
(1981) (holding that a statute addressing “the problem of sexual intercourse 
and teenage pregnancy” is “sufficiently related to the State’s objectives to 
pass constitutional muster”). 
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stated views to the school.117 Merely because Kuhlmeier would not be 
dispositive118 in a case in which there was no danger of misattribution 
of the views to the school would not prevent Kuhlmeier from 
providing support for a particular prohibition. 
The Morse Court limited Fraser by expressly rejecting that the 
“case should . . . be read to encompass any speech that could fit 
under some definition of ‘offensive,’”119 if only because “much political 
and religious speech might be perceived as offensive to some.”120 But 
saying that some “offensive” speech is protected is not very helpful 
without further specification of which speech is protected. 
Justice Thomas would simply hold that the First Amendment 
does not afford protection to student school speech.121 Justices Alito 
and Kennedy joined the Morse opinion “on the understanding 
that . . . it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can 
plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social 
issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the war on 
drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.’”122 But such a 
qualification “practically refutes itself.”123 If indeed “a nonsense 
message”124 can reasonably be interpreted as advocating illegal drug 
use, then such a message might—instead or in addition—be viewed as 
commenting on a social issue, in which case the prohibition’s 
constitutionality should not have been upheld. 
The Morse Court did not address whether “BONG HiTS 4 
JESUS” could reasonably be viewed that way, instead addressing 
whether it in fact was such a commentary.125 Because “not even 
Frederick argues that the banner conveys any sort of political or 
religious message,”126 the Court implied that the message could not be 
 
117. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 446 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Under the Court’s 
reasoning, must the First Amendment give way whenever a school seeks to 
punish a student for any speech mentioning beer, or indeed anything else that 
might be deemed risky to teenagers?”). 
118. Id. at 405 (majority opinion). 
119. Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 410–11 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he First Amendment, as originally 
understood, does not protect student speech in public schools.”). 
122. Id. at 422 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing id. at 445 (Stevens, J., dissenting)). 
123. Id. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
124. Id. 
125. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of the 
banner). 
126. Morse, 551 U.S. at 403. 
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read that way. Frederick was arguing that the message had no 
meaning,127 so it was unsurprising that he was not claiming that it 
had political or social content. If the message could be read as 
advocating illegal drug use—his denial of that meaning 
notwithstanding—then it could also be read as commenting on a 
social issue. Indeed, the Court as much as said that itself when 
offering the possible interpretation “bong hits [are a good thing],”128 
which is clearly commenting on a social issue. 
B. Student Speech Rights in Universities 
The student-speech jurisprudence is subject to a variety of 
interpretations. Some read Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse as offering 
narrow exceptions to Tinker.129 However, others read the 
jurisprudence as vague and undefined130 or, perhaps, as remaining 
open pending further developments.131 Not only is the best 
interpretation of the student-speech jurisprudence open to debate, but 
 
127. Id. at 402 (“The best Frederick can come up with is that the banner is 
‘meaningless and funny.’”). 
128. Id. (alteration in original). 
129. See Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A 
Comprehensive Approach, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 395, 404 (2011) (“Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse are seen as mere exceptions to Tinker’s general rule.”); 
see also Brandon James Hoover, The First Amendment Implications of 
Facebook, Myspace, and Other Online Activity of Students in Public High 
Schools, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 309, 326 (2009) (“In Fraser, the Court 
carved out the exception for lewd, sexual, and profane speech. Next, in 
Kuhlmeier, the Court carved out the exception for school-sponsored speech, or 
what may also be referred to as speech that includes the school’s imprimatur 
on it. And, recently, the Court, in Morse, carved out a special exception 
stating a school may categorically prohibit speech dealing with pro-drug 
messages.”); Darin M. Williams, Tinker Operationalized: The Judiciary’s 
Practical Answer to Student Cyberspeech, 62 DePaul L. Rev. 125, 134 
(2012) (“[T]he most efficient and reasonable approach to student speech is to 
first examine whether the speech in question falls into any of the exceptions 
outlined by Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and Morse”). 
130. See Benjamin F. Heidlage, A Relational Approach to Schools’ Regulation of 
Youth Online Speech, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 572, 579 (2009) (“In Fraser, 
Kuhlmeier, and Morse, the Court appears to have established exceptions to 
the Tinker substantial disruption test without expressly overruling it, leaving 
a muddled and erratic doctrine.”). 
131. See Mark Strasser, Tinker Remorse: On Threats, Boobies, Bullying, and 
Parodies, 15 First Amend. L. Rev. 1, 21 (2016) (“The [Morse] Court 
implied that both Fraser and Kuhlmeier left open how broadly the exception 
to Tinker should be read rather than representing limited exceptions involving 
perceived state endorsement or the use of sexually indecent language.”); 
Jorgensen, supra note 92, at 744 (“[W]hile Morse may appear as a narrow 
exception to the holding of Tinker, it has broad implications.”). 
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an additional difficulty is that the circuits are split with respect to 
whether this is the correct jurisprudence to apply when seeking to 
assess the constitutionality of dismissals of students from professional 
programs in college or graduate school.132 
It is not as if the Supreme Court has never addressed the consti-
tutionality of a student’s dismissal from a university program. In two 
different cases, the Court addressed whether student dismissals from 
professional programs violated due process guarantees. 
In Board of Curators of University of Missouri v. Horowitz,133 the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of the University of Missouri–
Kansas City Medical School’s dismissal of a student during her final 
year of study.134 Charlotte Horowitz claimed that her procedural due 
process rights had been violated by her dismissal.135 
During her first year of study several faculty had noted that her 
“‘performance was below that of her peers in all clinical patient-
oriented settings,’ that she was erratic in her attendance at clinical 
sessions, and that she lacked a critical concern for personal 
hygiene.”136 Many members of the faculty continued to be dissatisfied 
the following year.137 It was not as if the faculty failed to apprise her 
of their concerns—on the contrary, she was informed that the faculty 
believed that her skills were deficient and that the failure to improve 
would affect when or even whether she could graduate.138 Because she 
had been on notice and because there is a “significant difference 
between the failure of a student to meet academic standards and the 
violation by a student of valid rules of conduct,”139 the Court held 
that due process guarantees had been met.140 
The Court explained that academic and disciplinary judgments 
differed in important ways: “[a]cademic evaluations of a student, in 
contrast to disciplinary determinations, bear little resemblance to the 
judicial and administrative fact-finding proceedings to which we have 
 
132. See infra note 169 and accompanying text (discussing the circuit split). 
133. 435 U.S. 78 (1978). 
134. Id. at 79. 
135. Id. at 79–80. 
136. Id. at 81. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 85 (“The school fully informed respondent of the faculty’s 
dissatisfaction with her clinical progress and the danger that this posed to 
timely graduation and continued enrollment.”). 
139. Id. at 86. 
140. Id. at 84–85 (“Assuming the existence of a liberty or property interest, 
respondent has been awarded at least as much due process as the Fourteenth 
Amendment requires.”). 
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traditionally attached a full-hearing requirement.”141 Yet, by distin-
guishing in this way, the Court not only left open what would satisfy 
due process requirements in the University context where disciplinary 
action was at issue,142 but also how to distinguish between disciplinary 
and academic punishment.143 
The Horowitz Court characterized the “educational process [as] 
not by nature adversar[ial]; instead it centers around a continuing 
relationship between faculty and students.”144 Teachers are likely to 
need to take on a variety of roles as the student “advances through 
the varying regimes of the educational system, and the instruction 
becomes both more individualized and more specialized.”145 In 
addition, some deference is owed because “[c]ourts are particularly ill-
equipped to evaluate academic performance.”146 For all of these 
reasons, the Court refused to “formalize the academic dismissal 
process by requiring a hearing.”147 
In Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing,148 the Court exam-
ined whether the University of Michigan’s refusal to permit a student 
to retake an examination deprived that student of due process.149 
Scott Ewing was accepted into a special program at the University of 
Michigan whereby an individual could receive an undergraduate 
degree and a medical degree in six years.150 However, the program 
 
141. Id. at 89. 
142. See Mary Ann Connell & Donna Gurley, The Right of Educational 
Institutions to Withhold or Revoke Academic Degrees, 32 J.C. & U.L. 51, 70 
n.138 (2005) (suggesting that a sliding scale is used such that more due 
process is required where the punishments are more severe). 
143. Cf. Jack E. Byrom, To Love and Die in Dixon: An Argument for Stricter 
Judicial Review in Cases of Academic Misconduct, 31 Rev. Litig. 147, 170 
(2012) (“In order to protect the constitutional rights of these students, it is 
essential for the courts to clarify what issues qualify for protection as 
‘academic’ matters and what must be subject to due process analysis as 
‘disciplinary’ matters.”). 
144. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 92. 
147. Id. at 90. 
148. 474 U.S. 214 (1985). 
149. Id. at 215 (“The question presented is whether the University’s action 
deprived Ewing of property without due process of law because its refusal to 
allow him to retake the examination was an arbitrary departure from the 
University’s past practice.”). 
150. Id. (“In the fall of 1975 Ewing enrolled in a special 6-year program of study, 
known as ‘Inteflex,’ offered jointly by the undergraduate college and the 
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required the student to receive a passing score of a national exam 
prior to beginning the last two years.151 
After completing the requirements of the first four years,152 Ewing 
took and failed the national exam, receiving a 235 score where a 345 
score was required for passing.153 After considering Ewing’s record in 
some detail, the Promotion and Review Board dismissed Ewing from 
the program.154 Ewing wrote a letter requesting reconsideration, and 
the Board reconvened to reconsider its decision.155 Ewing personally 
addressed the committee, explaining why his score on the national 
test did not reflect his abilities.156 The Board again voted, reaffirming 
the decision to drop Ewing from the program.157 
Ewing appealed to the Executive Committee of the Medical 
school.158 After permitting him to speak in person, the Committee 
voted to deny his request for a leave of absence to give him an 
opportunity to retake the national exam.159 He appeared before that 
committee two more times, unsuccessfully seeking readmission to the 
Medical School.160 He then filed suit against the school, claiming that 
substantive due process guarantees had been violated.161 
The Supreme Court assumed for purposes of the case that Ewing 
did have a constitutionally protected property interest in continuation 
in the program.162 However, that right only entitled Ewing “to con-
 
Medical School. An undergraduate degree and a medical degree are awarded 
upon successful completion of the program.”). 
151. Id. at 215–16 (“The student must also pass the ‘NBME Part I’—a 2-day 
written test administered by the National Board of Medical Examiners.”). 
152. Id. at 216 (“Ewing successfully completed the courses prescribed for the first 
four years of the Inteflex program and thereby qualified to take the NBME 
Part I.”). 
153. Id. (“Ewing failed five of the seven subjects on that examination . . . .”). 






160. Id. at 216–17. 
161. Id. at 217 (“As a matter of federal law, Ewing alleged that he had a property 
interest in his continued enrollment in the Inteflex program and that his 
dismissal was arbitrary and capricious, violating his ‘substantive due process 
rights’ guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
162. Id. at 223. 
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tinued enrollment free from arbitrary state action,” and the Court 
accepted that the record contained no evidence of arbitrariness.163 
While other students had been allowed to retake the national 
exam in the past and Ewing was the first to have been denied that 
opportunity,164 that alone did not establish that the faculty was acting 
arbitrarily. The Court reasoned that “the faculty’s decision was made 
conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation 
of the entirety of Ewing’s academic career.”165 Further, the Court cau-
tioned that courts should not override such a decision “unless it is 
such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to 
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually 
exercise professional judgment.”166 
The Ewing Court noted that it might have been wiser to have 
permitted Ewing to take the test again, if only to avoid the costs 
associated with litigating this issue.167 Even so, the Court found that 
“his dismissal from the Inteflex program rested on an academic judg-
ment that is not beyond the pale of reasoned academic decision-
making when viewed against the background of his entire career at 
the University of Michigan, including his singularly low score on the 
NBME Part I examination.”168 Thus, even assuming that there is 
some substantive due process right to continuation in a university 
program, Ewing illustrates that such a right is rather weak because it 
only guards against arbitrary state action. 
II. Lower Courts on Dismissal from University 
Professional Programs 
The lower courts have addressed several cases in which the consti-
tutionality of a university dismissal from a professional program was 
at issue. However, the courts cannot agree about whether the Court’s 
high school student speech jurisprudence is applicable in the 
university context169 or about how to apply the Court’s guidance when 
 
163. Id. (“[T]he facts of record disclose no such action.”). 
164. Id. at 219. 
165. Id. at 225. 
166. Id. (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). 
167. Id. at 227. 
168. Id. at 227–28. 
169. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735 (7th Cir. 2005) (“We hold, therefore, 
that Hazelwood’s framework applies to subsidized student newspapers at 
colleges as well as elementary and secondary schools.”); Brown v. Li, 308 F.3d 
939, 951–52 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In view of a university’s strong interest in 
setting the content of its curriculum and teaching that content, Hazelwood 
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it does seem applicable. Rather than coalescing, the lower courts seem 
to be diverging about which standards to use or how they should be 
applied. 
A. Internet Postings 
Two cases out of Minnesota illustrate some of the difficulties that 
can arise when individuals post comments on the internet. One factor 
complicating these analyses was that some of the comments at issue 
 
provides a workable standard for evaluating a university student’s First 
Amendment claim stemming from curricular speech.”); Axson-Flynn v. 
Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 (10th Cir. 2004) (“[W]e hold that the 
Hazelwood framework is applicable in a university setting for speech that 
occurs in a classroom as part of a class curriculum.”); Vanderhurst v. 
Colorado Mountain Coll. Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 2000), as 
amended on denial of reh’g and reh’g en banc (“This court will thus assume 
for purposes of this appeal that the analytical framework established in 
Kuhlmeier is indeed appropriate to this case; we need not decide definitively, 
however, whether that framework does in fact govern a public college or 
university’s control over the classroom speech of a professor or other 
instructor.”). But see Brown, 308 F.3d at 957 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, 
C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“I disagree with Judge 
Graber because she would have this court adopt an erroneous First 
Amendment standard [Kuhlmeier] for a university’s attempts to regulate the 
speech of college and graduate students.”); Oyama v. Univ. of Haw., 813 F.3d 
850, 862 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2520 (2016) (“Nor has Judge 
Graber’s reasoning been adopted by our precedents since.”); id. (“When the 
University recommends a student for certification, it communicates to the 
world that, in its view, that student is fit to practice the profession; as a 
result, the University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it approves to 
teach.”); id. at 863 (“This case presents no occasion to extend student speech 
doctrine to the university setting.”); Pugel v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ill., 378 
F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 2004) (“As a teaching assistant employed by the 
University, Ms. Pugel was a public employee as well as a graduate student.”); 
id. at 667–68 (“We therefore evaluate Ms. Pugel’s speech under the well-
established Connick–Pickering framework of analysis.”); Flint v. Dennison, 
488 F.3d 816, 836 (9th Cir. 2007) (“By creating a student election process, the 
University of Montana has opened a limited public forum dedicated to allow 
campaigning for and election to leadership positions in student government. 
The University’s purpose in opening such a forum is to provide student 
candidates and student voters a certain type of educational experience. We 
hold that imposing an expenditure limitation on student candidates is 
viewpoint neutral and serves to effectuate the purpose of the ASUM elections. 
We therefore affirm the district court’s summary judgment in favor of 
defendants.”); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 352 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(discussing why Kuhlmeier was not appropriate to apply in university 
context); Student Gov’t Ass’n v. Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Mass., 868 F.2d 473, 
480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier . . . is not 
applicable to college newspapers.”). Cf. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 273 n.7 (“We 
need not now decide whether the same degree of deference is appropriate with 
respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the college and university 
level.”). 
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were viewed as threatening, which might have made the speech 
unprotected under the First Amendment in any event.170 The 
Minnesota Supreme Court decided one of the cases while the Eighth 
Circuit decided the other, although both decisions were somewhat 
confusing in their rationales. 
Tatro v. University of Minnesota171 involved a student who was a 
junior in the Mortuary Science Program at the University of Min-
nesota.172 The Mortuary Science Program is a special program for 
upper-class students preparing them to be morticians or funeral 
directors.173 The laboratory component makes use of voluntarily 
donated cadavers.174 
Amanda Tatro was enrolled in three required laboratory classes.175 
Prior to participating in any of those classes, she had entered into an 
agreement with the university that she would be respectful towards 
the cadavers.176 While the rules permitted “respectful and discreet” 
discussion “of cadaver dissection outside the laboratory,”177 they 
expressly “prohibited ‘blogging’ about the anatomy lab or cadaver 
dissection.”178 The anatomy lab instructor had explained that 
“‘blogging’ was intended to be a broad term,”179 and that the students 
had been told during their “orientation that blogging included 
Facebook and Twitter.”180 
Tatro posted statements on Facebook, which she has described in 
court filings as “satirical commentary and violent fantasy about her 
school experience.”181 Her posts included the following: 
 
170. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (“[T]he First 
Amendment . . . permits a State to ban a ‘true threat.’” (citing Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969))). 
171. 816 N.W.2d 509 (Minn. 2012). 
172. Id. at 511. 
173. Id. at 511–12. 
174. Id. at 512. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. (“Tatro . . . signed the Anatomy Bequest Program Human Anatomy 
Access Orientation Disclosure Form, acknowledging that she understood and 
agreed to comply with the program rules, as well as ‘additional laboratory 





181. Id. at 511. 
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Amanda Beth Tatro Gets to play, I mean dissect, Bernie 
today. Let’s see if I can have a lab void of reprimanding and 
having my scalpel taken away. Perhaps if I just hide it in my 
sleeve . . . [November 12, 2009] 
Amanda Beth Tatro Is looking forward to Monday’s 
embalming therapy as well as a rumored opportunity to 
aspirate. Give me room, lots of aggression to be taken out with 
a trocar. [December 6, 2009] 
Amanda Beth Tatro Who knew embalming lab was so 
cathartic! I still want to stab a certain someone in the throat 
with a trocar though. Hmm . . . perhaps I will spend the 
evening updating my “Death List # 5” and making friends with 
the crematory guy. I do know the code . . . [December 7, 2009] 
Amanda Beth Tatro Realized with great sadness that my 
best friend, Bernie, will no longer be with me as of Friday next 
week. I wish to accompany him to the retort. Now where will I 
go or who will I hang with when I need to gather my sanity? 
Bye, bye Bernie. Lock of hair in my pocket. [Undated.]182 
Her postings about stabbing someone with a trocar183 and hiding a 
scalpel in her sleeve made several individuals nervous.184 She was told 
to stay away from the department and staff while her comments were 
investigated.185 Tatro—who believed that she had been suspended—
reported the school’s actions and her posts to the media.186 She 
appeared on local TV channels, which resulted in the Anatomy 
Program receiving “letters and calls from donor families and the 
general public who expressed concerns about Tatro’s lack of 
professionalism, poor judgment, and immaturity.”187 
The Office of Student Conduct and Academic Integrity 
(“OSCAI”) began an investigation of Tatro’s conduct to see whether 
 
182. Id. at 512–13. 
183. Id. at 513 n.2 (“A trocar is a long hollow needle made of stainless steel that is 
typically inserted into the body during embalming to aspirate gas and 
fluids.”). 
184. Id. at 513 (“The Director testified that ‘[t]here was a lot of fear’ surrounding 
Tatro’s post about stabbing someone with a trocar and hiding a scalpel in her 
sleeve.”). 
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she had violated the University’s Student Conduct Code.188 Tatro 
appealed to the Campus Committee on Student Behavior (“CCSB”), 
challenging the OSCAI investigation.189 At the CCSB hearing, the 
director and two program instructors testified “about the program’s 
emphasis on respect, dignity, and professionalism as a foundation for 
later working as a funeral director or mortician, as well as the need 
for respect for the donors to the Anatomy Bequest Program.”190 The 
CCSB found Tatro “responsible for violating the Student Conduct 
Code provision prohibiting threatening conduct,”191 and also for 
having violated the anti-blogging rule.192 The CSSB recommended 
imposing the following sanctions: 
1. Changing Tatro’s grade in MORT 3171 to an “F.” 
2. Completion of a “directed study course” in clinical ethics. 
3. A letter to one of the faculty members in the Mortuary 
Science Program addressing the issue of respect within the 
program and the profession. 
4. A psychiatric evaluation at the student health service clinic 
and completion of any recommendations made by their 
evaluation. 
5. Placement on probation for the remainder of Tatro’s 
undergraduate career.193 
Those recommendations were adopted by the Provost,194 and 
Tatro challenged the imposition of those sanctions as a violation of 
her First Amendment rights.195 The Minnesota Supreme Court 




190. Id. at 514. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. (“The CCSB also found Tatro responsible for violating several University 
rules, . . . includ[ing] . . . Anatomy Laboratory Rule # 7, which provides in 
part that ‘[b]logging about the anatomy lab or the cadaver dissection is not 
allowable’ . . . .”). 
193. Id. at 514–15. 
194. Id. at 515. 
195. Id. at 515–16.  
196. See id. at 518 (concluding that University’s argument based on the Kuhlmeier 
case is not applicable to the case at bar).   
197. Id. at 519. 
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noting the parties’ agreement that “a university may regulate student 
speech on Facebook that violates established professional conduct 
standards,”198 the court further elaborated on the relevant test by 
suggesting that “any restrictions on a student’s Facebook posts must 
be narrowly tailored and directly related to established professional 
conduct standards.”199 When doing this analysis, the court focused on 
whether the “University’s restrictions on the mode, manner, and place 
of student speech are ‘substantially broader than necessary’ to achieve 
the objective of ensuring that students treat human cadavers with 
respect and dignity.”200 
Tatro complained that the University was enforcing “‘accepted 
unwritten social norms’—not any ‘specific standards or authorities 
governing professional behavior.’”201 For example, because her posts 
“did not reveal any personally identifiable facts, data, or information 
about the human cadaver she was studying,”202 she contended that the 
University’s claim that it was merely enforcing professional norms 
should be rejected and that the University was “violat[ing] her free 
speech rights by sanctioning her for using her ‘Facebook page as a 
literary device to express her emotions.’”203 But the high court 
disagreed, instead finding that “the academic program rules of the 
Mortuary Science Program, as applied, are narrowly tailored.”204 The 
court rejected that her discussion of the cadaver had been respectful. 
Giving the human cadaver a name derived from a comedy film 
about a corpse and posting commentary about “playing” with 
the human cadaver, taking her “aggression” out on the human 
cadaver, and keeping a “[l]ock of hair” in her pocket are 
incompatible with the notions of respect and dignity for the 
individual who chose to donate his body to support the research 
and education missions of the Anatomy Bequest Program.205 
 
198. Id. at 521. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 523 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). 
201. Id. at 521. 
202. Id. at 522. 
203. Id.  
204. Id. at 523. 
205. Id. 
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Tatro denied that her speech constituted a true threat,206 notwith-
standing her admission that others unfamiliar with her sense of humor 
might misunderstand the nature of her comments.207 The University 
argued that it could “constitutionally impose discipline for threatening 
speech that substantially disrupted the Mortuary Science Program.”208 
The court decided not to treat “the threatening speech as a stand-
alone violation, particularly since the complaint and sanctions here 
appear to have been based on the totality of the posts.”209 Perhaps 
that was because the court did not believe that her comments 
constituted a true threat,210 although the court might instead have 
believed that there were so many justifiable bases for the sanctions 
that there was no need to examine each. 
The court’s justifications for upholding the sanctions sent a 
variety of mixed signals. For example, the court noted that respectful 
treatment of cadavers “is imperative to maintaining the trust of the 
individuals who donate their bodies to the Anatomy Bequest 
Program.”211 There would be serious consequences if individuals lost 
faith in the University’s assurances of proper treatment—“there would 
not be a Mortuary Science Program if people were not willing to 
donate their bodies after death to the Anatomy Bequest Program.”212 
Yet, programs might be ended for a variety of reasons, such as a lack 
of adequate resources. The court noted that the university had not 
claimed that Tatro’s comments would result in fewer donations,213 but 
did not explain whether such a claim, if substantiated, would have 
 
206. Id. at 524 (“Tatro argues that the University cannot discipline her for any 
speech that does not constitute a ‘true threat’ and claims that her Facebook 
posts do not constitute a ‘true threat.’”). 
207. Id. at 514 (“She also knew that ‘all the Mort Sci kids’ would see the post, but 
she never intended to incite or induce fear in anyone. Tatro conceded, 
however, that she could understand how others might misunderstand her 
sense of humor, especially when taken out of context.”). 
208. Id. at 524. 
209. Id.  
210. See Meggen Lindsay, Note, Tinker Goes to College: Why High School Free-
Speech Standards Should Not Apply to Post-Secondary Students—Tatro v. 
University of Minnesota, 38 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1470, 1509 (2012) 
(“Arguably, the court did not undertake a true-threat analysis because 
Tatro’s speech clearly did not constitute a true threat.”). But see Tracey 
Wirmani, Note, Tinker Takes on Tatro: The Minnesota Supreme Court’s 
Missed Opportunity, 65 Okla. L. Rev. 769, 793 (2013) (“[T]he true threat 
standard would have met the university’s needs.”). 
211. Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 523. 
212. Id. at 523–24. 
213. Id. at 523. 
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justified the university’s actions. If so, then an individual student’s 
program completion might be dependent upon her not upsetting a 
generous donor. 
The reason that the University received a variety of complaints 
about Tatro’s actions was that she had appeared on local TV 
stations,214 which had occurred after Tatro had wrongly concluded 
that she had been suspended.215 But this was only indirectly related to 
the wrongful behavior for which she was being punished. Had the 
investigation of her Facebook postings remained internal to the 
University, it seems doubtful that the University would have received 
many calls about Tatro’s lack of professionalism. But one cannot tell 
from the court’s opinion whether her punishment would have been 
upheld if the program had not received any complaints from the 
public. 
Suppose that Tatro had appeared on local TV for some other 
reason such as explaining to the public what it was like to live with a 
particular disease.216 If she had identified herself as participating in 
the Mortuary Program and had she struck the audience as being 
unprofessional, the audience members might still have complained to 
the University and, perhaps, been less willing to support the Program. 
Presumably, her undermining the program in that way would not 
have made her subject to punishment. 
The Minnesota Supreme Court seemed to focus on ways that 
Tatro had disrupted the program, which was what the University had 
alleged.217 But the standard employed by the Minnesota Supreme 
Court was whether Tatro had violated “established professional 
conduct standards,”218 and the focus of those standards is not on the 
success of a particular university program but, instead, on assuring 
that professionals are respectful when handling the remains of loved 
ones.219 
 
214. Id. at 513 (“After Tatro appeared on local television stations, the Anatomy 
Bequest Program received letters and calls from donor families and the 
general public who expressed concerns about Tatro’s lack of professionalism, 
poor judgment, and immaturity.”). 
215. Id. at 513. 
216. Id. at 514 (“Tatro suffers from a debilitating central nervous system 
disease . . . .”). 
217. Id. at 523; see also supra note 211 and accompanying text (emphasizng that 
the “[u]niversity’s rules and policies governing access to human cadavers are 
unique because respectful treatment of human cadavers is imperative to 
maintaining the trust of the individuals who donate their bodies to the 
Anatomy Bequest Program.”). 
218. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 521. 
219. See Ashley C. Johnson, Note, “Narrowly Tailored” and “Directly Related”: 
How the Minnesota Supreme Court’s Ruling in Tatro v. University of 
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By focusing on the possibility that Tatro’s comments would 
reduce the number of donated cadavers, the court offered no guidance 
about how or whether to consider the views of those who expressed 
fear that Tatro might have a scalpel hidden in her sleeve or that 
Tatro might stab someone with a trocar. The expression of such views 
might be disruptive in a number of ways, because both instructors 
and students might be wary of working with or being near someone 
whom they view as dangerous.220 One could not tell whether the 
Minnesota Supreme Court believed those worries unfounded or, 
instead, a separate basis upon which the sanctions might have been 
justified.221 
The Eighth Circuit was afforded an opportunity to clarify whether 
a university student having made (allegedly) threatening statements 
justifies his dismissal from a professional program. Keefe v. Adams222 
involved a student, Craig Keefe, who had been removed from a 
Nursing Program for “behavior unbecoming of the profession and 
transgression of personal boundaries.”223 
A student had complained about some of Keefe’s Facebook posts, 
which she found “threatening and related to the classroom.”224 The 
complaining student said that she would be unable to function with 
him at the clinical site.225 
The Director of Nursing, Connie Frisch, set up a meeting with 
Keefe to express her concerns about some of his posts. Those posts 
included: 
Glad group projects are group projects. I give her a big fat F for 
changing the group power point at eleven last night and 
resubmitting. Not enough whiskey to control that anger. 
 
Minnesota Leaves Post-Secondary Students Powerless to the Often Broad and 
Indirect Rules of Their Public Universities, 36 Hamline L. Rev. 311, 325 
(2013) (“[The rules T]atro was found to have violated were directly related to 
established professional standards that require professionals within the 
mortuary field to treat all individuals encountered within the scope of the 
profession with dignity and respect.”). 
220. See Tatro, 816 N.W.2d at 513. 
221. See Wirmani, supra note 210, at 783 (“[T]he Minnesota Supreme Court failed 
to provide guidance to universities concerned about maintaining both student 
safety and First Amendment freedoms.”). 
222. 840 F.3d 523 (8th Cir. 2016). 
223. Id. at 525. 
224. Id. at 526. 
225. Id. at 532. 
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Doesn’t anyone know or have heard of mechanical pencils. Im 
going to take this electric pencil sharpener in this class and give 
someone a hemopneumothorax with it before to long. I might 
need some anger management. 
LMAO [a classmate], you keep reporting my post and get me 
banded. I don’t really care. If thats the smartest thing you can 
come up with than I completely understand why your going to 
fail out of the RN program you stupid bitch. . . . And quite 
creeping on my page. Your not a friend of mine for a reason. If 
you don’t like what I have to say than don’t come and ask me, 
thats basically what creeping is isn’t it. Stay off my page . . . .226 
Frisch thought the post about giving someone a 
hemopneumothorax the most disconcerting.227 However, she was also 
concerned about Keefe’s self-described anger-management issues, es-
pecially when he became argumentative during his meeting with 
her.228 
Keefe explained that he jokes on his Facebook page, although he 
also suggested that his page might have been hacked.229 However, he 
later confirmed in a deposition that he had written the posts in ques-
tion.230 Because of his lack of remorse and because he did not express 
a desire to change, Frisch decided to remove him from the program.231 
The Nursing Program Student Handbook stated that “all current 
and future students are expected to adhere to the policies and 
procedures of this student handbook.”232 Included within that 
handbook was the provision that “students who fail to meet the 
moral, ethical, or professional behavioral standards of the nursing 
program are not eligible to progress in the nursing program.”233 
Behaviors that offended this policy included “transgression of 
professional boundaries” and “behavior unbecoming of the Nursing 
Profession.”234 
 
226. Id. at 526–27. 
227. Id. at 527 n.3 (“Keefe testified that a hemopneumothorax is a ‘trauma’ where 







233. Id. at 528. 
234. Id. 
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A separate section of the handbook described the ways that indi-
viduals should treat their colleagues. “The nurse maintains compas-
sionate and caring relationships with colleagues and others with a 
commitment to the fair treatment of individuals, to integrity-
preserving compromise, and to resolving conflict.”235 The handbook 
noted in particular that the “standard of conduct precludes any and 
all forms of prejudicial actions, any form of harassment or threatening 
behavior, or disregard for the effect of one’s actions on others.”236 
Nurses are expressly told that they must “recognize[] and maintain[] 
boundaries that establish appropriate limits to relationships,” and 
that “[i]n all encounters, nurses are responsible for retaining their 
professional boundaries.”237 
When addressing “whether the First Amendment precludes a 
public university from adopting, as part of its curriculum for 
obtaining a graduate degree in a health care profession, the Code of 
Ethics adopted by a nationally recognized association of practicing 
professionals,”238 the Eighth Circuit began by rejecting the contention 
that Keefe’s postings were unprotected speech.239 This was a 
surprising way to begin, because comments about giving someone 
within the class a hemopneumothorax coupled with comments about 
one’s own anger-management issues might well be taken to constitute 
a true threat, which has already been recognized as a category of 
speech unprotected by the First Amendment.240 Indeed, the Eighth 
Circuit characterized one of the postings as “includ[ing] a physical 
threat related to their medical studies,”241 and unsurprisingly 
concluded that the “First Amendment did not bar educator Frisch 
from making the determination that Keefe was unable to meet the 
professional demands of being a nurse.”242 
Keefe had claimed that because his speech was protected by the 




237. Id. at 528–29. 
238. Id. at 529–30. 
239. See id. at 530 (stating that the First Amendment fully applies to Facebook 
postings).  
240. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (stating that “[f]or example, 
the First Amendment permits a State to ban ‘true threats’ . . . .”). 
241. Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532. 
242. Id. at 533. 
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pus speech.243 The Eighth Circuit rejected Keefe’s “categorical” ap-
proach,244 instead suggesting that “[a] student may demonstrate an 
unacceptable lack of professionalism off campus, as well as in the 
classroom, and by speech as well as conduct.”245 The court noted that 
two students had complained about Keefe’s comments to a 
professor.246 One said that she could not work “in the same clinical 
space with Keefe.”247 The court explained that “Keefe’s disrespectful 
and threatening statements toward his colleagues had a direct impact 
on the students’ educational experience [and] . . . also had the 
potential to impact patient care,”248 if only because those comments 
might make communication and collaboration difficult if not 
impossible.249 The mysterious part of the Eighth Circuit decision was 
not in its finding that Keefe’s expression was unprofessional, but in its 
suggesting that the threats were protected by the First Amendment.250 
The Eighth Circuit’s approach has at least two drawbacks. First, 
it makes unclear what would constitute threatening speech and, 
second, it seems to use a rather broad and ill-defined professionalism 
standard. Without more, one could not know what kind of off-campus 
speech would qualify as unprofessional and thus put an individual at 
risk of being dropped from a program if having made unpopular but 
non-threatening comments. 
B. Untoward Behavior 
Part of being a professional involves acting in appropriate ways 
and at least one issue involves which inappropriate actions will justify 
 
243. Id. at 531 (“On appeal, Keefe framed this contention categorically, arguing 
that a college student may not be punished for off-campus speech unless it is 
speech that is unprotected by the First Amendment, such as obscenity.”). 
244. Id. 
245. Id. (citing Yoder v. Univ. of Louisville, 526 F. App’x 537, 545–46 (6th Cir. 
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 790 (2013); Tatro v. Univ. of Minn., 816 
N.W.2d 509, 521 (Minn. 2012)).  
246. Keefe, 840 F.3d at 532. 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
249. See id. (“As [Professor] Scott testified, ‘when [students] are in the clinical 
setting taking care of patients, if we are creating [a] situation where they are 
not obviously communicating and collaborating, that can result in poor 
outcomes for the patients.’”). 
250. See Elissa Kerr, Note, Professional Standards on Social Media: How Colleges 
and Universities Have Denied Students’ Constitutional Rights and Courts 
Refused to Intervene, 41 J.C. & U.L. 601, 621 (2015) (“Central Lakes 
College could also have disciplined Keefe for the violent nature of his posts or 
the threats contained in them.”). 
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an individual’s dismissal from a professional program. Al-Dabagh v. 
Case Western Reserve University251 illustrates the wide range of 
behaviors that might be considered relevant when assessing an 
individual’s lack of professionalism. 
Case Western Medical School includes several “core compe-
tencies”252 within its curriculum, including that a student manifest 
professionalism in the following ways: 
Consistently demonstrate[] ethical, honest, responsible and 
reliable behavior. 
Identif[y] challenges to professionalism and develop[] a strategy 
to maintain professional behaviors when adherence to 
professional standards is threatened in the clinical and/or 
research settings. 
Engage[] in respectful dialogue with peers, faculty, and patients, 
to enhance learning and resolve differences. 
Recognize[] personal limitations and biases and find[] ways to 
overcome them.253 
Amir Al-Dabagh was a good student.254 However, his pro-
fessionalism was another matter. For example, in one of his first-year 
classes, he was tardy almost thirty percent of the time, which 
repeatedly delayed the class.255 He was accused of behaving 
inappropriately with some female classmates,256 although he disputed 
those charges, as well as a charge that he had taken a cab and then 
attempted to leave without paying.257 His alleged conduct resulted in 
his having to meet with a Committee on Students at the Medical 
School, “which forced him to undergo ‘an intervention on 
professionalism’ and threatened him with ‘dismissal’ if ‘further issues’ 
arose.”258 
 
251. 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015). 
252. Id. at 357. 
253. Id. 
254. Id. (“He did well academically.”). 
255. Id. 
256. Id. at 358 (“[T]wo female students accused Al–Dabagh of behaving 
inappropriately at a formal dance . . . .”). 
257. Id. (stating that Al-Dabagh claimed “[h]e never harassed anyone, never tried 
to welch on the driver”). 
258. Id. 
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He allegedly did not deal well with other medical personnel or 
patients on occasion.259 However, he believed that some of this 
criticism was due to his critical attitude toward one of his 
supervisors—a view corroborated by an independent evaluator.260 
Nonetheless, the Committee took strong action in light of these 
breaches, “requiring him to repeat [an] internship and enrolling him in 
‘gender specific training.’”261 In addition, the Committee decided to 
add a negative addendum to his recommendation for residency 
programs, which itself was both unusual and harmful to his career.262 
Despite all of these infractions, Al-Dabagh was invited to grad-
uate.263 But he acted inappropriately again. He was convicted of 
driving while intoxicated in North Carolina.264 He claimed that he had 
not been drunk, but had hit a utility pole when swerving to avoid 
hitting a deer.265 
The University refused to certify him for graduation and further 
dismissed him from the program.266 Al-Dabagh challenged his 
dismissal, arguing that it was based on infractions that either never 
occurred or had alternative explanations.267 The Sixth Circuit 
reasoned that deference was owed to the University both with respect 
to whether it credited his explanations of the events268 and with 
respect to whether it believed expulsion from the program the 
appropriate response in light of his lack of professionalism.269 
 
259. Id. (“Nurses and hospital staffers ‘consistently complained about his 
demeanor;’ a patient’s family once ‘kicked him out of the room;’ and he 
sometimes gave patient-status presentations without first preparing.”). 
260. Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. (“[A] faculty supporter described [the addendum] as ‘very 





267. Id. at 361 (“Al–Dabagh, last of all, claims that the Committee faulted him for 
things that didn’t happen (for instance, the sexual harassment incidents at 
the Hippo Ball) and disregarded his explanations for the things that did (for 
instance, his poor internship performance and his driving-while-intoxicated 
conviction).”). 
268. Id. (“It was neither arbitrary nor capricious for the Committee to credit other 
accounts above Al–Dabagh’s.”). 
269. Id. at 359 (“Al–Dabagh’s dismissal on professionalism grounds amounts to a 
deference-receiving academic judgment.”). 
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Al-Dabagh argued that the University’s position did not make 
sense—it was willing to recommend him for a residency despite his 
tardiness, the alleged incidents of inappropriate behavior with 
classmates, and the alleged attempt to leave a cab without paying.270 
It had even invited him to graduate before his car accident.271 It was 
only after he had been convicted of driving under the influence that 
he was expelled from the program.272 While drunk driving is itself a 
serious concern,273 that concern might be met by a state revoking his 
driver’s license274 rather than the university revoking his medical 
degree.275 Certainly, it would be a different story if Al–Dabagh had 
shown up drunk to treat patients.276 But there was no indication other 
than the one accident that Al–Dabagh had difficulties with alcohol,277 
and the Sixth Circuit itself admitted that the University’s position 
was “unconvincing.”278 Nonetheless, when Al–Dabagh invited the 
court to “decide for [itself] whether he behaved in a sufficiently 
professional way to merit a degree,”279 the court demurred, explaining 
 
270. Id. at 361. 
271. Id. at 358. 
272. Id.  
273. See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2178 (2016) (citing National 
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 2014 Alcohol–Impaired Driving 2) (“Alcohol 
consumption is a leading cause of traffic fatalities and injuries. During the 
past decade, annual fatalities in drunk-driving accidents ranged from 13,582 
deaths in 2005 to 9,865 deaths in 2011.”). 
274. See Major Frank W. Fountain, Aiding and Abetting Involuntary Manslaughter 
and Negligent Homicide: An Unprincipled Extension of Principal Liability, 
1991 Army Law. 3, 9 (1991) (“An increasing number of states also have 
enacted automatic license revocation laws, providing that drivers who fail or 
refuse to take an alcohol breath test automatically will lose their licenses.”). 
275. See Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 359 (“[C]ase Western did not move for a stay. 
Instead, it complied with the injunction and gave Al–Dabagh a degree. 
Thanks to its decision, Al–Dabagh is now a practicing resident. Doesn’t that 
moot the case? No, because the university will revoke that degree if it wins.”). 
276. Cf. Gabriel H. Teninbaum, Reforming the National Practitioner Data Bank to 
Promote Fair Med-Mal Outcomes, 5 Wm. & Mary Pol’y Rev. 1, 87–88 
(2013) (discussing the creation of the NPDB board to prevent incompetent 
doctors, such as a “doctor [who] reported to the emergency room while 
drunk[,]” from jumping from state to state without repercussion). 
277. But see Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 23 F. Supp. 3d 865, 870 (N.D. 
Ohio 2014), rev’d, 777 F.3d 355 (6th Cir. 2015) (“After the Ball, three 
students complained that Al–Dabagh was drunk at the dance and harassed 
several women with dance requests.”). 
278. Al-Dabagh, 777 F.3d at 361. 
279. Id. 
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that making such a judgment “goes beyond [its] job description.”280 No 
evidence was presented “suggest[ing] that the university had 
impermissible motives or acted in bad faith,”281 and the court was 
confident that “nothing in [its] deferential standard prevents [it] from 
invalidating genuinely objectionable actions when they occur.”282 
While the court understood that “an expansive view of 
professionalism might forgive, or provide a cloak for, arbitrary or 
discriminatory behavior,”283 the court saw “no such problem here.”284 
Al-Dabagh stands for the proposition that courts must give university 
academic decisions considerable deference.285 
C. Views or Practices? 
In Oyama v. University of Hawaii,286 the Ninth Circuit issued a 
decision that obscured—rather than clarified—its reasoning. At issue 
was the refusal of the University of Hawaii to permit Mark Oyama to 
become a student teacher.287 Oyama was a student in a secondary-
education certificate program at the University of Hawaii at Manoa,288 
a program that required the completion of coursework and one 
semester of student teaching.289 Acceptance into the program did not 
guarantee a student-teaching placement.290 
In a written assignment, Oyama expressed his view that sexual 
relations between children and adults should be legal if consensual.291 
When one of his teachers noted that Oyama would have to report a 
relationship between a twelve-year-old and an adult if such a rela-
tionship came to light, Oyama responded that he would follow the law 







285. Id. at 357 (holding that the “lack-of-professionalism finding amounts to an 
academic judgment to which courts owe considerable deference”). 
286. 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015). 
287. Id. at 854 (“The University of Hawaii denied secondary education candidate 
Mark L. Oyama’s application to become a student teacher, a prerequisite for 
recommendation to the State of Hawaii’s teacher certification board.”). 
288. Id. at 855. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 856 (“I even think that real life child predation should be legal, 
provided that the child is consentual [sic].”). 
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relationships were wrong.292 The teacher worried that Oyama might 
not be sufficiently sensitive to the needs of adolescents.293 
In addition, Oyama believed that many children characterized as 
having disabilities were “fakers”294—“he was ‘not convinced that many 
“disabilities” are actual disabilities or medically-based neurological 
conditions, but are rather the crude opinions of psychologists and 
psychiatrists.’”295 But such a view seemed inconsistent with “both an 
HTSB [Hawaii Teacher Standards Board] standard requiring teachers 
to ‘[p]rovide services to students in a nondiscriminatory manner’ and 
an NCATE [National Council for Accreditation of Teacher Education] 
standard requiring teachers to demonstrate professional dispositions 
necessary to teach ‘all students,’ including those ‘with exception-
alities.’”296 
Oyama participated in a field placement experience at a middle 
school where he received multiple unacceptable ratings with respect to 
his “ability to teach effectively, work collaboratively with colleagues, 
respond to suggestions from supervisors, and demonstrate the level of 
professionalism expected of middle school teachers.”297 Oyama’s super-
vising instructor concluded that “Mark would not do well as a middle 
school teacher.”298 
In analyzing whether Oyama’s constitutional rights had been 
abridged when he was denied the opportunity to do student teaching, 
the Ninth Circuit explained that “the University must comply with 
the Hawaii Teacher Standards Board’s (“HTSB”) teacher licensing 
and ethical standards. HTSB standards require teachers to, among 
other things, protect student safety, create an inclusive learning 
environment for all students, and demonstrate professionalism.”299 But 
Oyama’s comments allegedly undercut his ability to meet those 
standards. For example, “Oyama’s belief that young children can 
meaningfully ‘consent’ to sexual activity with adults, and failure to 
appreciate the lifelong impact on victims of child sexual abuse, could 
well impede him from recognizing signs of such abuse in his students 
 
292. Id. 
293. Id. (“Dr. Moniz . . . explain[ed] that, while she did not ‘mind that [Oyama] 
has opinions that are different from other people’s,’ she was concerned that 
Oyama ‘may not be aware of and in agreement with safety issues about the 
adolescents who will be in his care.’”). 
294. Id. at 857. 
295. Id. 
296. Id. at 858. 
297. Id. at 857. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. at 856. 
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or evidence of such abuse by school personnel.”300 Further, the 
University could reasonably “regard Oyama’s insistence that most 
disabilities are feigned and that requiring high school teachers to 
educate disabled students is unreasonable as indicators that he would 
not make the effort to identify students with disabilities or adjust his 
lessons for individual students whose disabilities require special 
accommodations.”301 
At least one question presented was whether the University’s posi-
tion violated First Amendment guarantees.302 The court rejected that 
the student speech doctrine, “standing alone, provides an adequate 
framework for evaluating Oyama’s claim.”303 Instead, the court 
created a hybrid test that drew from both school speech doctrine and 
public-employee speech doctrine,304 reasoning that the latter doctrine 
was applicable because “Oyama was a candidate for a certification 
that would allow him to work as a public school teacher.”305 
When discussing the school speech doctrine, the Ninth Circuit 
noted that “in Morse, the Court allowed the suspension of a student 
who held up a banner reading ‘BONG HiTS 4 JESUS’ as the Olympic 
torch passed by, reasoning that ‘schools may take steps to safeguard 
those entrusted to their care from speech that can reasonably be re-
garded as encouraging illegal drug use.’”306 After noting that the Uni-
versity had “an institutional responsibility . . . [to] limit certification 
recommendations to individuals suitable to enter the teaching 
profession,”307 the Ninth Circuit then reasoned that “[t]his 
institutional responsibility, like the ‘governmental interest in stopping 
student drug abuse’ in Morse, may allow the University to deny a 
student teaching application based on speech demonstrating that the 
applicant lacks the professional skills and disposition to enter a 
classroom, even as a student teacher.”308 
Yet, this analysis of Morse is, at best, incomplete. For example, in 
his concurrence, Justice Alito said that Morse “provides no support 
for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as 
 
300. Id. at 871. 
301. Id. 




306. Id. at 861 (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007)). 
307. Id. at 862. 
308. Id. (citing Morse, 551 U.S. at 408). 
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commenting on any political or social issue,”309 and it is difficult not 
to read Oyama’s comments as taking a position on a social issue. 
Certainly, if an individual does something to demonstrate that he 
cannot be a good teacher, then a university is justified in not 
certifying him. But then the question is whether the comments in a 
reflection piece about a video310 demonstrate that Oyama was 
unqualified. Suppose, for example, that his teachers had glowing 
reports about his performance in the classroom including an 
appropriate sensitivity to the needs and vulnerabilities of his students. 
Presumably, his comments would then not have demonstrated 
anything. 
The Ninth Circuit also discussed Kuhlmeier, which “recognizes a 
school’s interest in managing how it ‘lend[s] its name’ or its ‘imprima-
tur’ to student expression.”311 The court noted that “[w]hen the Uni-
versity recommends a student for certification, it communicates to the 
world that, in its view, that student is fit to practice the profession; as 
a result, the University places its ‘imprimatur’ on each student it ap-
proves to teach.”312 The Oyama court then concluded that “[b]ecause 
the certification process necessarily implicates the University’s ‘im-
primatur,’ the University is entitled to deference in determining how 
to ‘lend its name’ to certification candidates.”313 But this reading of 
Kuhlmeier makes it very broad—a university might be understood to 
be authorized to refuse to award degrees or, perhaps, revoke degrees314 
if its current or former student expressed a view to which the 
University did not wish to lend its imprimatur. After offering this 
rather broad reading of the school speech exceptions, the Ninth 
Circuit noted that “[t]his case presents no occasion to extend student 
speech doctrine to the university setting.”315 The court’s discussion 
was regrettable for two distinct reasons: (1) it might result in a 
dilution of student speech rights in secondary schools, and (2) it 
 
309. Morse, 551 U.S. at 442 (Alito, J., concurring). 
310. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 856 (discussing Oyama’s written reflection on a video 
entitled “Growing Up Online” in which Oyama stated, “I even think that real 
life child predation should be legal, provided that the child is consentual 
[sic].”). 
311. Id. at 862 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 
(1988)). 
312. Id. 
313. Id. (citing Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 272). 
314. See supra note 275 (citing Al-Dabagh v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 777 F.3d 
355, 359 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2817 (2015) (“[Case Western 
Reserve] University will revoke that degree if it wins.”). 
315. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 863. 
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might mislead other courts into applying the Court’s student speech 
jurisprudence in the University context, because the Oyama court 
devoted some time to discussing that jurisprudence in the context of a 
student dismissal from a university professional program. 
The Oyama court next addressed the public-employee doctrine, 
noting that the Second Circuit, in Melzer v. Board of Education of 
City School District of City of New York,316 had upheld the 
termination of a public school teacher after his association with North 
American Man/Boy Love Association (“NAMBLA”) became public.317 
The stated goal of NAMBLA is “to change the laws and attitudes 
governing sexual activity between men and boys.”318 The Second 
Circuit had not based its holding on a demonstrated incapacity to 
teach319 or on any inappropriate behavior with students.320 Instead, the 
teacher was fired in reaction to parent complaints when his NAMBLA 
membership became known.321  
The Oyama court also discussed the firing of a high school 
counselor upheld by the Seventh Circuit in Craig v. Rich Township 
High School District 227,322 when that counselor had written a book 
advocating that women engage in promiscuous behavior before 
marriage.323 The Seventh Circuit suggested that the School Board had 
“reasonably predicted that [his book,] ‘It’s Her Fault[,]’ would 
interfere with the learning environment” at the school,324 and that the 
“[d]efendants’ interests in protecting the integrity of counseling 
services at Rich Central dwarfed Craig’s interest in publishing.”325 
After discussing these cases, the Ninth Circuit explained that, 
“[h]owever useful public employee speech doctrine may appear, . . . it 
cannot control our analysis of Oyama’s First Amendment claim,”326 
 
316. 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003). 
317. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865 (discussing Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189–192, 199). 
318. Id. 
319. Melzer, 336 F.3d at 189 (“For his school activities and teaching he received 
several commendations.”). 
320. Id. (“[T]he record before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in any 
illegal or inappropriate conduct at Bronx Science.”). 
321. Id. at 191 (“Many of the 50 or 60 parents in attendance [at a parent 
association meeting] expressed anger at Melzer’s NAMBLA affiliation. They 
threatened to remove their children and conduct a sit-down strike at the 
school if Melzer were allowed to return.”). 
322. 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013). 
323. See Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865 (citing Craig, 736 F.3d at 1114). 
324. Craig, 736 F.3d at 1120. 
325. Id. 
326. Oyama, 813 F.3d at 865–66. 
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because “Oyama was not a government employee”327 and because 
“public employee speech doctrine provides no basis for considering the 
role of academic freedom at public universities.”328 The court noted 
that “[a]s a student at the University of Hawaii, Oyama enjoyed 
greater freedom to test his ideas, critique professional conventions, 
and develop into a more mature professional than he would as a 
government employee.”329 However, this is very confusing. The court 
discusses a jurisprudence and then says that the jurisprudence is 
inapplicable, which makes it difficult to understand why the court 
bothered to offer that analysis at all. 
The Oyama court looked at some of the school certification cases 
as well, noting that “these decisions lack a common doctrinal foun-
dation.”330 Nonetheless, those decisions seemed to support the rule 
that “universities may consider students’ speech in making 
certification decisions, so long as their decisions are based on defined 
professional standards, and not on officials’ personal disagreement 
with students’ views.”331 Thus, when offering its analysis, the Ninth 
Circuit looked at the school speech cases, but then announced that 
they were not applicable; looked at the public employee speech cases, 
but then announced that they were not applicable; and then decided 
for some reason that a hybrid of the two lines of cases provided the 
appropriate test.332 The court then examined the school certification 
cases, which did not provide a helpful standard except insofar as they 
were in agreement that deference to “defined professional standards”333 
was appropriate. 
The Ninth Circuit said that “the University could look to what 
Oyama said as an indication of what he would do once certified.”334 Of 
course, Oyama did not say that he would have relations with 
students. On the contrary, he said that he would report such relations 
if they came to his attention.335 Nor did he say that he would not try 
 
327. Id. at 866. 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. at 867. 
331. Id. at 867–68. 
332. See id. at 860 (explaining that, because of “the mixed characteristics of 
Oyama’s claim,” the court decided to apply both the public employee speech 
and student speech doctrines). 
333. Id. at 872. 
334. Id. at 870 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 152 (1983)) (emphasis 
added). 
335. Id. at 856. 
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to help every student, although he did suggest that “it is not 
reasonable to expect secondary school teachers to have the ‘extremely 
diverse skillset’ needed to teach the range of grade levels presented in 
a mainstream classroom that includes students with learning 
disabilities.”336 An individual should not be barred from teaching 
merely because she suggests that there are significant challenges when 
teaching students with very different abilities, and an individual who 
may have had limited contact with children with special needs may 
find that her past misconceptions, for example, that 90 percent are 
fakers,337 are in fact misconceptions when she has met more students 
with those needs. That said, the Ninth Circuit may well have been 
correct in upholding the refusal to permit Oyama to do student 
teaching because his performance in the classroom raised a number of 
red flags indicating that he would not be a good teacher.338 
Nonetheless, the court’s suggestion that “[i]n the context of a public 
university’s professional certification program, the university may 
evaluate the student’s speech, made in the course of the program, in 
determining the student’s eligibility for certification without offending 
the First Amendment under certain circumstances,”339 may well chill 
much speech and give universities too much discretion. Further, if 
students are on notice that their speech could be used against them 
should the university decide to dismiss them from the program, then 
the students will be incentivized to keep those views to themselves 
rather than expose them to possible correction or modification by 
airing them. Thus, although the Ninth Circuit may have been correct 
to affirm the decision not to permit Oyama to do student teaching, 
the court’s interpretation of the governing jurisprudence is likely to 
have regrettable consequences. 
D. Dismissals and Religious Convictions 
Many of the cases involving student dismissals from professional 
programs suggest that universities are afforded a great deal of 
deference, especially if a student has been dismissed for academic 
reasons.340 However, less deference is sometimes given when students 
 
336. Id. at 856–57. 
337. Id. at 857. 
338. Id. (“Oyama received an ‘unacceptable’ rating as to the ability to teach 
effectively, work collaboratively with colleagues, respond to suggestions from 
supervisors, and demonstrate the level of professionalism expected of middle 
school teachers.”). 
339. Id. at 876. 
340. See supra notes 171–339 and accompanying text (discussing Tatro, Keefe, Al-
Dabagh, and Oyama, in which the courts granted deference to universities in 
making academic judgments regarding professionalism). 
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claim to have conscientious objections to performing certain tasks, 
although the analyses offered in at least some of these cases have not 
been particularly persuasive. 
At issue in Axson-Flynn v. Johnson341 was a requirement imposed 
in the University of Utah’s Actor Training Program (“ATP”) that a 
student engage in behaviors to which she had religious objections.342 
When Christina Axson-Flynn auditioned for the ATP and was asked 
“if there was anything she would feel uncomfortable doing or saying 
as an actor,”343 she responded that “she would not remove her 
clothing, ‘take the name of God in vain,’ ‘take the name of Christ in 
vain’ or ‘say the four-letter expletive beginning with the letter F.’”344 
At one point during the audition, Axson-Flynn allegedly said, “‘I 
would rather not be admitted to your program than use these words’ 
and ‘I will not use these words.’”345 
Axson-Flynn was admitted to the program.346 During the first 
semester, she refused to utter the words that she found offensive even 
if her assignments called for her to do so, and she nonetheless did 
well.347 After the first semester, the faculty advised her to “get over”348 
her reluctance to say those words because “not using the words would 
stunt her growth as an actor.”349 Rather than overcome her aversion 
to saying certain words, she voluntarily left the program, at least in 
part because she assumed that she would eventually be forced out.350 
That assumption was based on a conversation that she had with the 
program director.351 
 
341. 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004). 
342. See id. at 1280–82 (discussing the program’s requirement that Axson-Flynn 
say the words “goddamn” and “fucking” as part of a class exercise  and 
Axson-Flynn’s refusal to say those words because of her religious beliefs).  




347. Id. at 356 F.3d at 1282 (“For the rest of the semester, Axson-Flynn was 
allowed to omit any language she found offensive during class exercises.”) 
(citing Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329 (D. Utah 2001), 
rev’d, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004)). 
348. Id. at 1280. 
349. Id. 
350. Id. 
351. See id. at 1282 (“Axson-Flynn went to Sandy Shotwell, the director of the 
ATP. She said to Shotwell, ‘. . . If I do not—and this is what you said—
modify my values by the end of the semester, I’m going to have to find 
another program. Is that right?’ Shotwell replied, ‘Well, yes.’”). 
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Axson-Flynn filed suit against the University of Utah, claiming 
that her being forced to say words to which she objected was 
compelled speech in violation of her First Amendment speech rights 
and her being compelled to say sinful words violated her free-exercise 
rights.352 When analyzing the constitutional issues, the Tenth Circuit 
began by discussing the Court’s school speech cases,353 noting that the 
ATP classroom constitutes a nonpublic forum.354 The court explained 
that it would “uphold the ATP’s decision to restrict (or compel) that 
speech as long as the decision was ‘reasonably related to legitimate 
pedagogical concerns,’”355 a very deferential approach. What were the 
pedagogical concerns? (1) “[I]t teaches students how to step outside 
their own values and character by forcing them to assume a very 
foreign character and to recite offensive dialogue;”356 (2) “it teaches 
students to preserve the integrity of the author’s work;”357 and (3) “it 
measures true acting skills to be able convincingly to portray an 
offensive part.”358 
Presumably, there are numerous ways to teach students how to 
step outside their own values and character, to preserve a work’s 
integrity, and to convincingly portray an offensive part.359 But if that 
is so, it might be thought surprising that a Program would insist that 
Axson-Flynn be willing to utter certain words in particular. But the 
court said it was not “second-guess[ing] the pedagogical wisdom or 
efficacy of an educator’s goal.”360 That said, the court was willing to 
“investigate whether the educational goal or pedagogical concern was 
pretextual”361 and would “override an educator’s judgment where the 
 
352. Id. at 1283. 
353. See id. at 1284 (referencing the court’s application of Tinker and Hazlewood 
to explain the First Amendment rights of students in public schools). 
354. Id. at 1285. 
355. Id. at 1290 (citing Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926 
(10th Cir. 2002)). 
356. Id. at 1291. 
357. Id. 
358. Id. 
359. See Rebecca Metz, Acting: How Do Actors Prepare for Emotional and 
Intense Scenes in Movies?, Quora (Jan. 31, 2014), 
https://www.quora.com/Acting-How-do-actors-prepare-for-emotional-and-
intense-scenes-in-movies [https://perma.cc/UMV6-RDER] (“Preparation for 
an emotionally demanding scene is very personal, and varies with each actor 
and scene or role. Some actors follow formal techniques, some have developed 
modifications to these ‘pure’ approaches, and others have developed 
techniques of their own.”). 
360. Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1292 (emphasis added). 
361. Id. at 1293. 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 68·Issue 1·2017 
Student Dismissals from Professional Programs and the Constitution 
142 
proffered goal or methodology was a sham pretext for an 
impermissible ulterior motive.”362 
Axson-Flynn claimed that she was being forced to say offensive 
words “because of ‘anti-Mormon sentiment.’”363 She supported that 
contention in two ways: 
1. During her deposition, Axson-Flynn had queried, “They 
respect other kids’ freedom of religion that aren’t [Mormon]. 
Why won’t they respect mine?” Her example was that one 
individual had been accommodated because he was not required 
to come to class on a Holy Day.364 
2. Axson-Flynn’s teachers had noted that other Mormons had 
not objected to the requirement that they utter these offensive 
words, and those teachers recommended that Axson-Flynn 
speak to others sharing her faith to see if she could say these 
words without violating her religious duties.365  
Suppose that the Program had found from past experience that 
not punishing a student who was absent one day because of a death 
in the family, illness, or a religious holiday would not undermine that 
student’s training as an actor but that a student’s refusal to ever say 
particular lines would undermine that person’s training. Such a Pro-
gram might permit an individual to be excused from class on Good 
Friday, but might not permit her to refuse to utter words that might 
be construed as taking the Lord’s name in vain.366 It would be difficult 
to construe such a policy as anti-Catholic unless the very policy of 
requiring a student to take the Lord’s name in vain was itself viewed 
as manifesting animus towards any religion prohibiting such 




364. Id. at 1298 (“[A] Jewish student named Jeremy Rische asked for and received 
permission to avoid doing an improvisational exercise on Yom Kippur without 
suffering adverse consequences.”). 
365. See id. at 1293 (discussing the program’s insistence that “Axson-Flynn speak 
with other ‘good Mormon girls’ and that she could ‘still be a good Mormon’ 
and say these words”). 
366. See Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42 U. Kan. L. Rev. 411, 
411 n.2 (1994) (“[T]he Catholic church regards as sinful the taking of the 
Lord’s name in vain . . . .”). 
367. See Bradley C. Johnson, By Its Fruits Shall Ye Know; Axson-Flynn v. Johnson: 
More Rotted Fruit from Employment Division v. Smith, 80 Chi.-Kent L. 
Rev. 1287, 1309–10 (2005) (“[B]y joining a free exercise claim and a free speech 
claim, the Smith hybrid rights exception should, in theory, be sufficient to 
prevent a state from constitutionally compelling someone to swear without 
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Certainly, Axson-Flynn might have objected to her teachers’ 
pointing to the views of “other ‘good Mormon girls’”368 and might 
have sincerely felt that her religion precluded her from saying these 
words even if others disagreed. Indeed, she might have cited Thomas 
v. Review Board369 for support. Thomas involved a Jehovah’s Witness 
who believed that he could not as a matter of conscience produce 
weapons.370 A co-worker told Thomas that it was not “unscriptural”371 
to help produce weapons, but Thomas disagreed. The Thomas Court 
suggested that Thomas’s beliefs could not be second-guessed,372 
making clear that “the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to 
beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.”373 
So too, Axson-Flynn’s beliefs should not have been second-guessed, 
even if others of her faith had a different view. That said, however, 
just as no evidence was cited in Thomas to establish that the Indiana 
workers’ compensation board had an anti-Jehovah’s Witness bias 
merely because it took seriously that other members of the faith did 
not share Thomas’s view,374 the professors who noted that others of 
Axson-Flynn’s faith had a different view did not thereby indicate 
animus. 
Might there have been animus behind the insistence that Axson-
Flynn utter words that she found religiously offensive? Perhaps. But 
 
having to modify or overrule Smith.”); see also Ryan S. Rummage, In 
Combination: Using Hybrid Rights to Expand Religious Liberty, 64 Emory L.J. 
1175, 1220 (2015) (“Because there was a valid hybrid rights claim, the court 
would then balance the interests of both Axson-Flynn and the public university 
under the strict scrutiny standard . . . .”). 
368. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1293 (discussing how the program’s words 
certainly could raise “concern that hostility to her faith rather than a 
pedagogical interest in her growth as an actress was at stake in Defendants’ 
behavior in this case.”). 
369. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). 
370. Id. at 710 (“[H]e quit, asserting that he could not work on weapons without 
violating the principles of his religion.”). 
371. Id. at 711. 
372. Id. at 715 (“Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew 
was an unreasonable one.”). 
373. Id. at 715–16. 
374. See id. at 723 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“[I]t cannot be said that the State 
discriminated against Thomas on the basis of his religious beliefs or that he was 
denied benefits because he was a Jehovah’s Witness.”). 
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the evidence cited does not suggest animus and, indeed, there was evi-
dence to the contrary.375 
When analyzing whether free exercise guarantees had been 
violated, the Tenth Circuit noted that “[n]eutral rules of general 
applicability ordinarily do not raise free exercise concerns even if they 
incidentally burden a particular religious practice or belief.”376 But the 
court explained that “[a] rule that is discriminatorily motivated and 
applied is not a neutral rule of general applicability.”377 Because there 
allegedly was a “genuine issue of fact in the record as to whether 
Defendants’ requirement of script adherence was pretextual,”378 the 
court remanded the case to determine “whether the script adherence 
requirement was discriminatorily applied to religious conduct (and 
thus was not generally applicable).”379 The court warned that “[u]nless 
Defendants succeed in showing that the script requirement was a 
neutral rule of general applicability, they will face the daunting task 
of establishing that the requirement was narrowly tailored to advance 
a compelling governmental interest.”380 
Suppose that the University had indeed applied its rule in a 
neutral and generally applicable way. A separate issue is whether an 
individual exemption should have been offered. The court noted that 
the University sometimes granted exemptions, stating that “a Jewish 
student named Jeremy Rische asked for and received permission to 
avoid doing an improvisational exercise on Yom Kippur without 
suffering adverse consequences.”381 The court’s description is 
informative: 
Defendant Barbara Smith, who taught First Year Acting, gave 
him this exemption despite the fact that, in Rische’s words, “she 
said it would be an exercise that couldn’t be made up, because 
it was one of the exercises by—an improv exercise that involved 
 
375. See infra note 386 and accompanying text (noting that Axson-Flynn’s 
professors previously had exempted her from the script adherence 
requirements). 
376. Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1294 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Church 
of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993); 





381. Id. at 1298. 
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the whole class, and it would be almost impossible to make 
up.”382 
This was a group exercise, so there would be no way for Rische to 
come in at a different time to make up the class. Because Rische suf-
fered no diminution in grade, the court implied that he was receiving 
preferential treatment. There was no discussion of how other students 
were treated if they missed one class that could not be made up; for 
example, whether someone who was gravely ill on an improv day 
would have her grade lowered. 
It was not as if this student would never participate in improv 
exercises—he simply would not do this on a particular Holy Day.383 So 
too, an individual might refuse to attend class on a Holy Day of 
Obligation,384 but might be willing to perform all of the required exer-
cises on other days. Axson-Flynn was not merely saying that she 
could not do the required performance on a particular day—she was 
never willing to perform the exercises at issue. 
Ironically, the court noted a different example in which a student 
had been afforded an exemption—Axson-Flynn herself had been ex-
empted from an exercise.385 Because of that, the court wondered 
whether there was a “system of individualized exemptions,”386 even 




383. Regrettably, some commentators do not see the importance of differentiating 
between the contents of the exemptions. See Nicholas M. Gaunce & Robert 
Luther III, Deliver Us from Evil: Why Bankruptcy Judges May Properly Rely 
on the Free Exercise Clause & RFRA to Protect Church Property from the 
Grasps of Tort-Creditors, 43 Val. U. L. Rev. 641, 654 (2009) (“In 
addressing her claim, the court considered the application of the 
individualized exemption doctrine to the ATP. Specifically, it found that 
instructors in the program had previously granted exemptions from specific 
scenes to Axson-Flynn and another student on religious grounds.”). 
384. Cf. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 62–63 (1986) (“The tenets 
of the church require members to refrain from secular employment during 
designated holy days, a practice that has caused respondent to miss 
approximately six schooldays each year.”). 
385. See Axson-Flynn, 356 F.3d at 1299 (“Defendants sometimes granted Axson-
Flynn herself an exemption from their script adherence requirement . . . .”). 
386. Id. 
387. See Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 151 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1334 (D. Utah 2001), 
rev’d, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Plaintiff has pointed to no reference in 
curricular policy, guidelines or course descriptions themselves where a system 
of exemptions are extended to students for religious or other reasons.”). 
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Two points might be made about this individualized exception 
discussion. First, there was scant evidence of a policy of individualized 
exemptions—the only two who had received such exemptions were 
Rische and Axson-Flynn, herself. Second, if the fact that Rische was 
permitted to miss class without incurring a punishment indicated 
favoritism, then the fact that Axson-Flynn was allowed to avoid 
saying certain words during the first semester without incurring 
punishment would seem to indicate favoritism rather than unfavorable 
treatment. By the same token, her having been excempted from the 
general rules during the first semester hardly indicates anti-Mormon 
bias. 
At the very least, the Axson-Flynn court is sending mixed 
messages. The court hints that the requirement that individuals speak 
the lines written is pretextual because (1) a different individual had 
been excused from attending class on a Holy Day, and (2) Axson-
Flynn herself had received an exemption from being required to speak 
the lines one semester but not the next. But if that is enough to 
justify a remand for a finding of pretextual action, courts will be very 
busy indeed.388 Further, if permitting individuals to miss class on a 
Holy Day without punishment means that all religious beliefs must be 
accommodated, then public schools will either have to make no 
allowances389 or they will have to make many allowances.390 For 
example, would a school excusing attendance on a religious holiday be 
forced to have segregated classes if an individual was forbidden from 
being in close physical proximity to someone of a different sex who 
was not the person’s spouse?391 
 
388. See Edgar Dyer, Axson-Flynn v. Johnson: Will Students or Institutions 
Control Curriculum and Pedagogy at Public Universities in the U.S. Tenth 
Circuit?, 196 Ed. L. Rep. 745, 752 (2005) (“The Tenth Circuit was surely 
dissembling when it noted that the religious nature of Axson-Flynn’s claims 
had no bearing on their holding, because any such allegations in the Tenth 
Circuit with even specious claims of religious discrimination must now be 
played out before a jury.”). 
389. Johnson, supra note 367, at 1314 (“If the government does not create a system 
of individualized exemptions, the exception is wholly unavailable.”). 
390. Cf. Dyer, supra note 388, at 751 (“[Axson-Flynn] has established a precedent in 
the Tenth Circuit for students to use their religion as a pretext for not 
complying with the course requirements in any particular class.”). 
391. Cf. Michael Paulson, When a Plane Seat Next to a Woman Is Against Orthodox 
Faith, N.Y. Times (April 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/ 
10/us/aboard-flights-conflicts-over-seat-assignments-and-religion.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/L5QY-UJUL] (“Francesca Hogi, 40, had settled into her aisle 
seat for the flight from New York to London when the man assigned to the 
adjoining window seat arrived and refused to sit down. He said his religion 
prevented him from sitting beside a woman who was not his wife.”). 
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The difficulties for universities that are suggested by the Axson-
Flynn approach are amplified when one considers how many views 
might qualify as religious. Watts v. Florida International University392 
illustrates this point. At issue in Watts was the dismissal of John 
Watts from a practicum and then from a degree program at Florida 
International University (“FIU”).393 
Watts was enrolled in a Masters of Social Work program at 
FIU.394 Part of his coursework included a practicum. As part of the 
practicum, he was counseling a patient who lacked a diagnosis.395 
After talking to her, he recommended that she “join a bereavement 
support group.”396 She “asked where she could find such a group.”397 
Watts noticed that she self-described as Catholic, and he included a 
church among the possible places that she could go.398 
He was dismissed from the program using the Pickering test399 
because of his alleged “inappropriate behavior related to patients, re-
garding religion.”400 The Eleventh Circuit explained that “[t]he Picker-
ing decision recognized that government ‘has interests as an employer 
in regulating the speech of its employees that differ significantly from 
those it possesses in connection with regulation of the speech of the 
citizenry in general.’”401 But Watts had paid his tuition and was doing 
the practicum as part of his coursework,402 so it was not clear why he 
should be treated as a government employee.403 
 
392. 495 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2007). 
393. Id. at 1291. 
394. Id.  
395. Id.  
396. Id. at 1292. 
397. Id. 
398. Id. 
399. See id. at 1294 (“[J]udged under Pickering, the termination of Watts from the 
practicum because of what he said during the private counseling session does 
not violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
400. Id. at 1292. 
401. Id. at 1293 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).  
402. See id. at 1292 (“Watts registered for the course, paid his tuition, and was 
assigned to Fair Oaks Hospital, a private psychiatric institution affiliated with 
FIU for purposes of the practicum.”); see also Neal H. Hutchens et al., 
Employee or Student?: The First Amendment and Student Speech Arising in 
Practica and Internships, 306 Ed. L. Rep. 597, 601 (2014) (“Students enrolled 
in the practicum were required to register for course hours and pay tuition.”). 
403. See supra note 327 and accompanying text (explaining that Oyama was not an 
employee and hence his speech claim should not be evaluated in light of the 
government employee speech jurisprudence). 
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The Eleventh Circuit then explained that Watts “pleaded a valid 
First Amendment free exercise of religion claim.”404 Watts was not a 
Catholic.405 Nonetheless, he claimed to have the religious belief that “a 
patient who professes a religion is entitled to be informed if the 
counselor is aware of a religious avenue within the patient’s religion 
that will meet the appropriate therapy protocol for the patient.”406 
The issue then became whether Watts’ sincere belief was itself 
religious. The Watts court explained: “Our dissenting colleague 
acknowledges that Watts has adequately pleaded the sincerity of his 
belief, but believes that he has failed to plead sufficiently that the 
belief is of a religious character.”407 However, the majority disagreed, 
in part because it was not sure how one could show that a particular 
belief was itself religious.408 But if that is so, then any sincerely held 
beliefs will have to count as religious if an individual says that they 
are,409 as long as the individual cannot be shown to be lying about his 
own view as to whether they are religious.410 
A separate question is whether an individual is compelled by 
those religious beliefs to act in a particular way. The Watts court 
suggested that Watts would have to “plead that he believes his 
religion compels him to take the actions that resulted in his 
termination.”411 Yet, that may be overstating the requirement—it 
would be surprising if an individual could not be terminated for 
 
404. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1294. 
405. See id. at 1296 (quoting Amended Complaint at 8, Watts v. Fla. Int’l Univ., 
No. 02-60199-CIV, 2005 WL 3730879 (S.D. Fla. June 9, 2005)) (“Mr. Watts is 
a Christian. He is not Catholic.”). 
406. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 8, Watts, No. 02-60199-CIV, 2005 WL 
3730879). 
407. Id. (citing id. at 1301 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting)). 
408. See id. at 1296 (“[W]e question whether a plaintiff could ever plead or proffer 
‘objective’ facts that his particular sincerely held belief is religious in nature. 
Religion is by its nature subjective.”). 
409. In interpreting a federal statute, the Seeger Court considered the role played 
by particular beliefs when deciding whether they counted as religious. See 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (“We think it clear that the 
beliefs which prompted his objection occupy the same place in his life as the 
belief in a traditional deity holds in the lives of his friends, the Quakers.”). It is 
simply unclear whether the role played by the beliefs is an additional criterion 
for constitutional purposes. 
410. Watts, 495 F.3d at 1298 (“The question is not whether the plaintiff’s beliefs are 
religious in the objective, reasonable person’s view, but whether they are 
religious in the subjective, personal view of the plaintiff.”). 
411. Id. at 1297. 
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performing legal actions required by his religion,412 but could be 
terminated for performing legal actions strongly encouraged but not 
required by his religion. 
Certainly, a court does not get to reject religious beliefs merely 
because it does not agree with them.413 Nonetheless, combining the 
views suggested in Watts and Axson-Flynn might prove very challeng-
ing for any university whose professional program involved require-
ments that might seem to be in conflict with any religious views. 
Another case out of the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how such a 
conflict might be handled. 
Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley414 involved Jennifer Keeton, a student 
in a degree program at Augusta State University to obtain a master’s 
degree in school counseling.415 After she completed her first year in the 
program, she was asked to “participate in a remediation plan 
addressing what the faculty perceived as deficiencies in her ability to 
be a multiculturally competent counselor, particularly with regard to 
working with gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and 
queer/questioning (GLBTQ) populations.”416 Keeton had a number of 
beliefs regarding sexual orientation “arising from her Christian 
faith.”417 For example, she “believed that the GLBTQ population 
suffers from identity confusion, and . . . she intended to attempt to 
convert students from being homosexual to heterosexual.”418 
Keeton alleged that “officials told her that ‘you couldn’t be a 
teacher, let alone a counselor, with those views,’ asked her to alter 
some of her beliefs, and said that she had a choice of adhering to the 
Bible or to the ACA Code of Ethics.”419 However, the officials denied 
making those statements, and instead “testified that they never told 
 
412. See Emp’t Div v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (“Even if we were inclined 
to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation 
field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable 
criminal law.”). 
413. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 
(1981) (“[R]eligious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or 
comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.”). 
414. 664 F.3d 865 (11th Cir. 2011). 
415. See id. at 867 (addressing Keeton’s request for a preliminary injunction to keep 
the university from dismissing her from the degree program should she fail to 
complete a plan addressing her inability to work successfully with GLBTQ 
individuals). 
416. Id. 
417. Id. at 868. 
418. Id. 
419. Id. at 870. 
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her that she needed to alter her beliefs or that her beliefs were wrong 
or unethical, and that she could continue to maintain her personal re-
ligious beliefs and still become an effective counselor.”420 Further, stu-
dents had testified that “professors told Keeton in class that she did 
not need to change her beliefs, but instead needed to be aware of her 
beliefs and not impose them on the client.”421 
The American Counseling Association’s (“ACA”) Code of Ethics 
included the following: 
(1) Section A.1.a: “The primary responsibility of counselors is to 
respect the dignity and to promote the welfare of clients”; 
(2) Section A.4.b: “Counselors are aware of their own values, 
attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors and avoid imposing values that 
are inconsistent with counseling goals. Counselors respect the 
diversity of clients, trainees, and research participants”; 
(3) Section C.2.a: “Counselors gain knowledge, personal 
awareness, sensitivity, and skills pertinent to working with a 
diverse client population”; and 
(4) Section C.5: “Counselors do not condone or engage in 
discrimination based on age, culture, disability, ethnicity, race, 
religion/spirituality, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, 
marital status/partnership, language preference, socioeconomic 
status, or any basis proscribed by law.”422 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “if ASU’s officials imposed 
the remediation plan because of Keeton’s personal religious views on 
homosexuality, it is presumed that they violated her constitutional 
rights.”423 However, the court rejected that remediation had been 
imposed because of her views, instead suggesting that “the evidence 
shows that the remediation plan was imposed because she expressed 
an intent to impose her personal religious views on her clients, in 
violation of the ACA Code of Ethics, and that the objective of the 
remediation plan was to teach her how to effectively counsel GLBTQ 
clients in accordance with the ACA Code of Ethics.”424 
Keeton had explained that “as a high school counselor confronted 
by a sophomore student in crisis, questioning his sexual orientation, 
 
420. Id. 
421. Id. at 872. 
422. Id. at 869 (quoting ACA Code of Ethics §§ A.1.a, A.4.b, C.2.a, C.5 (Am. 
Counseling Ass’n 2014)). 
423. Id. at 872. 
424. Id. 
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she would tell the student that it was not okay to be gay.”425 Keeton 
had told another student that “if a client discloses that he is gay, it 
was her intention to tell the client that his behavior is morally wrong 
and then try to change the client’s behavior, and if she were unable to 
help the client change his behavior, she would refer him to someone 
practicing conversion therapy.”426 
But Keeton’s announced intentions were not in accord the ACA’s 
“fundamental principles, including that counselors must support their 
clients’ welfare, promote their growth, respect their dignity, support 
their autonomy, and help them pursue their own goals for counsel-
ing.”427 Further, the school’s “curriculum requires that all students be 
competent to work with all populations, and that all students not im-
pose their personal religious values on their clients, whether, for in-
stance, they believe that persons ought to be Christians rather than 
Muslims, Jews or atheists, or that homosexuality is moral or immor-
al.”428 
The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that “ASU has conditioned 
participation in the clinical practicum and graduation on compliance 
with the ACA Code of Ethics.”429 But Augusta State University did 
not arbitrarily decide to condition graduation on compliance with that 
Code. On the contrary, “ASU must adopt and follow the ACA Code 
of Ethics in order to offer an accredited program.”430 Because Keeton 
“voluntarily enrolled in the program, [she] does not have a 
constitutional right to refuse to comply with those conditions.”431 
The court rejected that ASU forced “Keeton to profess a belief 
contrary to her own personal beliefs.”432 Instead, “the ACA Code of 
Ethics . . . requires those who wish to be counselors to separate their 
personal beliefs from their work.”433 Suppose, for example, that a stu-
dent seeks moral validation of a behavior that the counselor does not 
believe morally permissible. “When a GLBTQ client asks, for 
example, if his conduct is moral, students are taught to avoid giving 
advice, to explore the issue with the client, and to help the client 
 
425. Id. at 868. 
426. Id. at 869. 
427. Id. at 874. 
428. Id. 
429. Id. at 878. 
430. Id. at 876. 
431. Id. at 878. 
432. Id. 
433. Id. 
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determine for himself what the answer is for him.”434 The ACA Code 
of Ethics does not require a counselor to adopt the patient’s view as 
her own—“the ACA Code of Ethics requires the counselor to affirm 
the client, which means that the counselor must respect the dignity of 
the client by accepting the client’s response without judgment, not 
that the counselor must say that she personally believes that the 
client is correct.”435 
While the Keeton court suggested that Keeton’s announced inten-
tion to try to dissuade individuals with a same-sex orientation from 
living that “lifestyle”436 and to refer someone for “conversion 
therapy,”437 involved her intention to “impose her personal religious 
views on her clients,”438 the Keeton decision cannot plausibly be read 
to suggest that Keeton would have been acting in accord with the 
Code of Ethics had she instead said that she would simply refuse to 
counsel any GLBTQ students.439 The Code “requires the counselor to 
affirm the client,”440 although the counselor is not required to “say 
that she personally believes that the client is correct.”441 Regrettably, 
the Sixth Circuit offered an interpretation of Keeton that was at best 
implausible. 
Ward v. Polite442 involved a challenge by Julea Ward to her 
expulsion from a counseling program at Eastern Michigan 
University.443 During her three years in the program, Ward frequently 
said that her religious beliefs precluded her from affirming the value of 
same-sex relationships or the value of certain non-marital 
 
434. Id. at 878–79. 
435. Id. at 879. 
436. Id. at 868. 
437. Id. at 869. 
438. Id. at 872. 
439. But see Ward v. Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 741 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Instead of 
insisting on changing her clients, Ward asked only that the university not 
change her—that it permit her to refer some clients in some settings.”); Curtis 
Schube, Catch 22: The Rising Concern of Faith Being Removed from 
Counseling and the First Amendment Concerns Associated, 35 N. Ill. U. L. 
Rev. 375, 384 (2015) (“Where Ward differs from Keeton is that Ward did 
not impose values, but rather just wanted to not counsel the client at all.”). 
440. Keeton, 664 F.3d at 879. 
441. Id. 
442. 667 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2012) 
443. Id. at 729–32 (stating Ward’s assertion that her expulsion violated her First 
and Fourteenth Amendment rights). 
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relationships.444 But that presented a potential difficulty, both because 
of national nondiscrimination standards and because of a university 
policy requiring counselors to be supportive of their clients. 
Part of her coursework included a practicum.445 During the 
practicum, students spent at least forty hours counseling multiple cli-
ents.446 Ward counseled two individuals without incident.447 However, 
when she was reviewing the file of the third individual, “she noticed 
he sought counseling about a same-sex relationship.”448 She then 
sought advice from her counselor—she was not sure whether it would 
be better to refer the individual from the beginning or wait to refer 
until it became clear that she would have to affirm the individual’s 
relationship.449 After Ward decided to refer the individual, the 
University began a disciplinary hearing and eventually expelled her 
from the program.450 Ward challenged the expulsion as a violation of 
First Amendment guarantees.451 
The Sixth Circuit noted that there was no written policy 
preventing students from referring patients to others.452 
Notwithstanding “the university’s claim that a no-referral policy 
existed for the practicum class, supported by the testimony of several 
professors and administrators, and in view of the reality that the 
purported policy arises in the context of a university’s curriculum and 
its counseling services,”453 the Sixth Circuit believed that that was 
ample authority to believe “that no such policy existed.”454 After all, 
 
444. See id. at 729 (“In three years with the program, Julea Ward frequently 
expressed a conviction that her faith (Christianity) prevented her from 
affirming a client’s same-sex relationships as well as certain heterosexual 
conduct, such as extra-marital relationships.”). 
445. See id. at 730 (“[S]he enrolled in a counseling practicum, a graduation 
prerequisite that requires students to apply what they have learned through 
one-on-one counseling sessions with real clients.”). 
446. Id. 
447. Id. 
448. Id. at 730–31. 
449. Id. at 731. 
450. See id. at 730. 
451. See id. at 732 (“Her expulsion from the program, she claimed, violated her 
free-speech and free-exercise rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.”). 
452. See id. at 739 (“The university defendants, as shown, cannot point to any 
written policy that barred Ward from requesting this referral.”). 
453. Id. at 740. 
454. Id. at 739 (“Ample evidence supports the theory that no such policy existed—
until Ward asked for a referral on faith-based grounds.”). 
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the court noted, the school permitted students to refer clients “for 
additional counseling services outside the Counseling Clinic.”455 But 
merely because a student is permitted to refer someone for additional 
counseling, it can hardly be thought to justify offering no counseling 
and instead telling an individual to go somewhere else, especially if 
one of the prime directives of the ACA policy “is to respect the 
dignity and to promote the welfare of clients.”456 
The Ward court offered an additional example in which a referral 
had been permitted. There was “one instance . . . when the school 
permitted a practicum referral, allowing a grieving student to refrain 
from counseling a grieving client.”457 The University described this as 
a single incident rather than a policy,458 but the court was confident 
that this example “calls into question the basis for the university’s 
actions.”459 After all, the fact that “the counseling department was 
willing to avoid unsuitable student-client matches in some 
instances”460 made the court wonder why Ward was treated 
differently.461 However, the grieving student was not saying that she 
would never help someone who was grieving; instead, that student 
was saying that she simply could not offer such counseling at that 
time. Unlike the grieving student, Ward was not merely saying that 
she could not counsel a gay student on this occasion because of some 
temporary affliction that Ward, herself, was suffering. 
To support the position that the University was engaging in 
wrongdoing, the Ward court noted: “The school permits students to 
request certain types of clients to counsel—what you might call a yes-
referral policy—and the school will honor the request.”462 This seemed 
to be a problem. “Why a school would honor student requests to 
counsel clients with certain types of problems but refuse requests not 
to counsel clients with certain types of problems is not self-evident.”463 
Yet, students who can be especially helpful for certain kinds of clients 
should be permitted to assist those clients, since those students would 
 
455. Id. at 736. 
456. See Keeton, 664 F.3d at 869 (quoting ACA Code of Ethics § A.1.a (Am. 
Counseling Ass’n 2014)). 
457. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737 (emphasis added). 
458. Id. (“The university demurs, claiming this was not a ‘referral’ but a ‘single 




462. Id. at 736. 
463. Id. at 736–37. 
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be fulfilling ACA goals of affirming each client. But someone who 
refuses to counsel a client because of her disapproval of that client is 
not acting in accord with the universal affirmation policy of ACA. 
Perhaps the Ward court simply believed that the ACA policy was 
wrongheaded. The court wrote: 
Surely, for example, the ban on discrimination against clients 
based on their religion (1) does not require a Muslim counselor 
to tell a Jewish client that his religious beliefs are correct if the 
conversation takes a turn in that direction and (2) does not 
require an atheist counselor to tell a person of faith that there is 
a God if the client is wrestling with faith-based issues. Tolerance 
is a two-way street.464  
The court is correct that individuals are not required to affirm the 
truth of the religious views or other faiths. But, as the Keeton court 
explained, the ACA “requires the counselor to affirm the client,” even 
if the counselor does not subscribe to the client’s beliefs.465 The Sixth 
Circuit’s position went much further. One infers that the Sixth 
Circuit would say that just as Ward should be allowed to refer a 
GLBTQ person rather than offer that person counseling, an individual 
with conscientious objections to counseling someone of another 
religion should be allowed to refer that person rather than offer 
counseling. But this is exactly the kind of approach that the ACA 
principles are designed to preclude. 
Permitting referrals as a general matter might not impose too 
great a burden on a client if there were relatively few who would 
invoke that privilege and if there were always enough counselors to 
take care of the needs of the clients. Even were that so, such a policy 
would seriously undermine the ACA principles. However, matters 
would be even worse if there weren’t enough counselors to provide 
needed services to disfavored communities. 
Apparently, Ward had said that she could set aside certain 
religious values but not others. “Ward said that she could ‘set aside 
her religious values’ and counsel clients about things such as 
‘abortion, child abuse, and murder’ but ‘could not set aside her 
religious values in order to effectively counsel non-heterosexual 
clients.’”466 But if she was distinguishing between the way that she 
would approach cases involving same-sex relationships from those 
implicating issues involving “abortion, child abuse, and murder” in 
that she could not affirm those in the former group, then she seemed 
 
464. Id. at 735. 
465. Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 879 (11th Cir. 2011). 
466. Ward, 667 F.3d at 737. 
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to be saying that she could be affirming of those in the latter group. 
Perhaps she was saying that she could counsel the latter group, even 
though she would not be affirming abortion, child abuse, or murder. 
But that was what she was being asked to do with “non-heterosexual 
clients,”467 namely, support those clients even if not personally 
endorsing their relationships. 
Ward denied that she was discriminating on the basis of sexual 
orientation. “She had no problem counseling gay and lesbian clients, 
so long as the university did not require her to affirm their sexual 
orientation.”468 Nevertheless, her teachers suspected that she was 
discriminating on the basis of orientation,469 itself prohibited by ACA 
rules,470 which is why they were exploring why she could set aside her 
religious values and counsel those who had abortions or who had 
committed child abuse or murder but she could not do so for GLBTQ 
clients. 
The Ward court characterized the teachers as “suggest[ing] a 
distinction between secular values and spiritual ones, with a 
preference for the former over the latter.”471 But this is simply wrong. 
The teachers were trying to figure out why religious values were being 
invoked in one case and not the other. That teachers were trying to 
figure out what Ward was saying or doing does not establish that 
those teachers had a pretextual dislike of religious values as a general 
matter or even of Ward’s religious values in particular. 
Was Ward being punished for her views? Perhaps. But the Ward 
court seemed almost willfully blind to non-invidious explanations of 
the University’s practices and seemed to ignore the very Code that 
governed the accreditation of this Program. The court claimed to be 
applying the same reasoning as was found in Keeton, but offered an 
account of that decision that turned the decision on its head. The 
court’s specious reasoning raised more questions about its own 
approach than that of Eastern Michigan University. 
In Ward, the Sixth Circuit was anything but deferential; in Al-
Dabagh it was extremely deferential. How much deference should be 
accorded to universities or professional standards? Both universities 
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and students might have some difficulty answering that question 
when considering some of the recent circuit decisions. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Court’s student-speech jurisprudence is unclear 
about the extent to which it protects high school students’ First 
Amendment rights, which itself is a matter of concern. One additional 
concern is that courts cannot agree about whether the student-speech 
jurisprudence applies in the university context. Courts simply do not 
know what standard to use when judging whether dismissals of 
university students from professional programs pass muster, which 
means that relevantly similar cases will be decided in light of different 
First Amendment tests depending upon the circuit. 
Not only is there no agreement about the correct principle, but 
the courts cannot even agree about whether to be deferential to 
universities. Instead, courts are sometimes extremely deferential to 
university decision-making and at other times view university policies 
and practices with a jaundiced eye. 
It is simply unclear whether universities must adopt written, 
exception-less policies even when doing so would undermine legitimate 
pedagogical goals, or, instead, will be afforded flexibility. Some of the 
recent decisions suggest the following approach—universities will be 
given great deference unless their policy contradicts sincere religious 
beliefs, in which case the policy will be carefully scrutinized. But such 
a policy invites individuals with sincere beliefs to categorize them as 
religious, which would entitle those beliefs to much deference. 
The current approach to student dismissals from professional pro-
grams is unsustainable. The Court must offer guidance about which 
principle should be applied, how it should be applied, and what uni-
versities must do when their policies are not in accord with a 
student’s religious beliefs. Having offered little to no guidance on 
these matters, the Court has almost guaranteed inconsistent 
application across the Circuits. The ever-increasing confusion in the 
circuits suggests that this will be a growing problem unless the Court 
clarifies these matters. 
